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THE HEARSAY EXCEPTION FOR PUBLIC RECORDS IN
FEDERAL CRIMINAL TRIALS
Vincent C. Alexander*
The rule against hearsay evidence generally excludes out-of-court
statements offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted
therein.' It seeks to ensure that cases are decided on the basis of reli-
able evidence by requiring that the declarant of a statement testify
before the factfinder under oath and be subject to cross-examina-
tion.2 There are numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule, however,
which are justified, in part, by the inherent reliability of the state-
ments involved.3
* Associate Professor of Law, St. John's University. B.A., Yale University; J.D., St. John's
University.
I FED. R. EVID. 801(c); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 246 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
2 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 245. The principal reason for the exclusion of hearsay evi-
dence is that, without cross-examination, the credibility of the declarant cannot be adequately
tested. Id. Cross-examination is generally thought to be the most effective means in an adver-
sary system of probing the factors upon which credibility depends: perception, memory, hon-
esty, and accuracy in narration. G. LILLY, EVIDENCE § 49 (1978); 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367
(3d ed. 1940); Morgan, The Relation Between Hearsay and Preserved Memory, 40 HARV. L.
REV. 712, 712 (1927). The hearsay rule's general requirement of in-person testimony is also
premised on the belief that the oath increases the probability that the witness will speak the
truth and that observation of courtroom demeanor will be helpful in the factfinder's assessment
of credibility. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 245. Although it may be possible to impugn the
credibility of an out-of-court declarant without cross-examination through reputation evidence,
prior inconsistent statements, prior bad acts, or a showing of bias, observation of a witness'
demeanor and reactions on the stand is thought to enhance the factfinder's ability to determine
credibility. Weinstein, The Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331, 334 (1961).
3 Dean Wigmore's thesis was that each hearsay exception is justified by a "circumstantial
probability of trustworthiness" and an element of necessity. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, §
1420. He observed that the two factors of reliability and necessity vary in relative strength
among the exceptions. Id. Others have argued, however, that a coherent theory which would
explain all of the exceptions does not exist and that some are premised solely on historical
accident, necessity, the adversary nature of litigation, or mere absence of motive to falsify.
Morgan & Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REV. 909, 921
(1937).
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The hearsay exception for "public records" was recognized at com-
mon law and has been further developed in most jurisdictions by
statute.4 The reliability of public records is said to derive from the
presumption of regularity and accuracy that attends the recording of
events by public officials." As with the hearsay exception for records
made in the regular course of a private business, the reliability of
many public records is enhanced by the routine and repetitive cir-
cumstances under which such records are made.6 An additional justi-
fication for the admission of public records is public convenience: If
government employees are continually required to testify in court
with respect to matters they have witnessed or in which they have
participated in the line of duty, the efficiency of public administra-
tion will suffer.7 It has also been observed that a public official's writ-
ten report of an event may be more reliable than his memory, as re-
vealed through in-court testimony, because of the volume and
repetitiousness of his work.8 As a result, there may be no appreciable
benefit to the factfinding process by requiring the courtroom appear-
ance and cross-examination of the public official. Accordingly, public
records have generally been held admissible regardless of the public
employee's availability to testify.'
If a report were prepared by government agents in anticipation of a
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 315. Although the requirements for satisfaction of the ex-
ception vary depending upon the jurisdiction or statute involved, generally the statement must
have been made by a public employee in the regular course of his public duties and he must
have been under a duty to record the statement in question. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, §
1633. Also, to be admissible the report must be based upon the first-hand knowledge of the
public official. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 317. See Yates v. Bair Transport, Inc., 249 F.
Supp. 681, 682-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (police report of accident inadmissible as business record to
the extent that the relevant information was provided by a bystander). This requirement can
be satisfied, however, if the public official relied upon information furnished to him by a
subordinate with personal knowledge. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
803(8)[02], at 804-195 to -196 (1981). The contents of the record may also qualify for admission
if the particular statement falls within an independent hearsay exception, such as an admission
by a party. See United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957, 964-65 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The personal
knowledge requirement has proved a stumbling block to the admissibility of conclusions con-
tained in government investigative reports based on data provided by nongovernment employ-
ees. McCormick, Can the Courts Make Wider Use of Reports of Official Investigations?, 42
IOWA L. REV. 363, 363-64 (1957). In civil actions, Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(C) has introduced a
liberalizing trend in this regard. See infra note 55.
5 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1631.
6 G. LILLY, supra note 2, § 70.
7 C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 315. Under Dean Wigmore's analysis, see supra note 3,
public convenience was cited as the "necessity" factor justifying the public records hearsay
exception. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1631.
' C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 315.
9 Id.
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criminal prosecution, however, the foregoing assumptions concerning
the inherent reliability of the report as evidence against the accused
are subject to serious dispute because of the adversarial posture of
the parties. Moreover, the use of such records in some cases may con-
travene the defendant's sixth amendment right to confront the wit-
nesses against him. In enacting rule 803(8) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence,10 Congress intended to minimize such problems by exclud-
ing from the public records exception, in respect to a criminal prose-
cution, reports of "matters observed by police officers and other law
enforcement personnel" and "factual findings resulting from an in-
vestigation made pursuant to authority granted by law."1
Courts have not, however, reached a consensus as to the proper
scope of the exclusions. In this regard, several significant interrelated
10 FED. R. EviD. 803(8) provides that the following types of records constitute an exception to
the hearsay rule:
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in
any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or
agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters
there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by
police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceed-
ings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an
investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of informa-
tion or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
Other provisions in the Federal Rules relating to government and quasi-government records as
hearsay exceptions include: Fed. R. Evid. 803(9) (records of vital statistics, such as birth and
death certificates); id. 803(10) (certification or testimony concerning the absence of a public
record); id. 803(22) (judgment of previous conviction).
Prior to adoption of the Federal Rules in 1975, admissibility of public records in federal cases
was governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1733(a) (1976). Courts also admitted public records into evidence
under the Business Records Act, Act of June 20, 1936, ch. 640, § 1, 49 Stat. 1561 (repealed
1975), on the theory that government operations are a form of "business." See, e.g., Salsberg v.
Modern Transfer Co., 325 F.2d 737, 738 (2d Cir. 1963) (police report); La Porte v. United
States, 300 F.2d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 1962) (selective service file); Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des
Moines Steel Co., 183 F.2d 467, 473 (3d Cir. 1950) (Bureau of Mines report regarding cause of
disaster).
" FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(B)-(C). The exclusions apply only when the evidence is used against
the defendant. Subdivision (C) explicitly permits the defendant to use investigatory factfind-
ings against the government. See supra note 10. Although subdivision (B) on its face excludes
police reports "in criminal cases" without exception, United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), held that police reports are admissible "when offered by a criminal defendant to
support his defense." Id. at 965 (emphasis in original). The Smith court observed that reading
subdivision (B) in harmony with (C) would be consistent with congressional intent, id. at 968
n.24, and that the unqualified language of (B) simply may have been the result of legislative
oversight since it was added on the floor of Congress, whereas (C) was the product of more
careful drafting. Id. See infra notes 41-53 and accompanying text. A police report offered by
the defendant against the government, however, must still satisfy the requirements for admissi-
bility as a hearsay exception. See United States v. Sims, 617 F.2d 1371, 1377 (9th Cir. 1980)
(FBI agent's report containing description of bank robbers inadmissible because information
was provided by bystander); supra note 4.
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issues have arisen. One problem is whether the exclusions should be
given literal effect or whether some degree of flexibility may properly
be read into the rule to permit admissibility in certain cases. A sec-
ond problem is whether rule 803(8) exclusively governs the hearsay
status of public records or whether admissibility may be premised on
other hearsay exceptions. Additional issues include whether an objec-
tionable report may be rendered admissible by the courtroom ap-
pearance of its author, and whether it may properly serve as the basis
of an expert witness' trial testimony. This Article will analyze both
the conceptual background and the legislative history of rule 803(8)'s
exclusions in order to suggest the proper approach to these issues.
I. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE
803(8)
In civil trials, numerous public records are admissible under Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 803(8)." In criminal trials, however, the rule
generally permits only records describing the "activities" of an office
or agency"3 and reports of matters observed in the line of duty by
non-law enforcement officers.14 The government is explicitly prohib-
ited from using against criminal defendants hearsay reports concern-
ing the observations of law enforcement officers and the factual find-
ings of government investigations. 6 The reasons for the exclusions lie
in the constitutional right of confrontation as well as Congress' intent
to preclude the use of inherently unreliable evidence.
A. The Constitutional Background
Legislative history reveals that Congress excluded police reports
and government investigatory fact-findings on the ground that their
admission might violate a criminal defendant's constitutional right to
confront the witnesses against him. 6 At the time the Federal Rules
" See supra note 10.
" FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(A).
Id. 803(8)(B).
' Id. 803(8)(B)-(C).
" See infra notes 41-55 and accompanying text. The sixth amendment provides "that in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Confrontation is a fundamental right in criminal cases
and is obligatory upon the states through the fourteenth amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
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were under consideration by Congress, 7 the Supreme Court had
neither articulated a definitive standard for resolving conflicts be-
tween hearsay exceptions and the confrontation clause nor addressed
the specific problem of the public records exception.'8 In decisions
dealing with the constitutionality of particular applications of various
other hearsay exceptions,' however, the Court had established a few
guiding principles. The confrontation clause was said to have embod-
ied a "preference for face-to-face accusation" by a witness at trial,20
'T The first Preliminary Draft of the Federal Rules, prepared by an advisory committee ap-
pointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, was published in 1969. 46 F.R.D. 161-426
(1969). Although the Supreme Court approved the Rules in 1972 to become effective in 1973, 56
F.R.D. 184 (1972), Congress refused to permit the Rules to take effect unless expressly author-
ized by Congress. Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9. Congressional considera-
tion of the Rules spanned the period from February 1973 to January 2, 1975, when they were
enacted into law with various revisions, to take effect July 1, 1975. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L.
No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926. See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7076-78.
"8 Numerous commentators have criticized the Court's lack of a unified approach in dealing
with confrontation issues and have suggested various interpretations of the clause. See, e.g.,
Baker, The Right to Confrontation, the Hearsay Rules, and Due Process-A Proposal for De-
termining When Hearsay May Be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 CONN. L. REV. 529 (1974); Daven-
port, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions:
A Functional Analysis, 85 HARv. L. REV. 2378 (1972); Graham, The Right of Confrontation
and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule]; Graham,
The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and the Forgetful Witness, 56 TEx. L. REV. 151
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Graham, The Forgetful Witness]; Natali, Green, Dutton & Cham-
bers, Three Cases in Search of a Theory, 7 Rurr.-CAM. L. REV. 43 (1975); Read, The New Con-
frontation-Hearsay Dilemma, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1972); Seidelson, Hearsay Exceptions and
the Sixth Amendment, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 76 (1971); Westen, The Future of Confronta-
tion, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1185 (1979).
19 See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (co-conspirator's out-of-court statement im-
plicating defendant held not violative of sixth amendment); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149
(1970) (prior inconsistent testimony given during preliminary hearing at which defendant's
counsel conducted cross-examination held admissible at subsequent trial in which witness be-
came forgetful); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (prosecutor's failure to make diligent ef-
forts to secure trial attendance of witness invalidated use of witness' preliminary hearing testi-
mony); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965) (when defendant's accomplice invoked his
privilege against self-incrimination on the stand, preventing cross-examination, it was a denial
of defendant's right of confrontation to permit prosecutor to read aloud the accomplice's con-
fession, implicating the defendant); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (error to admit, at
trial, prior testimony taken during preliminary hearing at which defendant was not represented
by counsel and did not conduct cross-examination); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-
44 (1895) (use of prior trial testimony of witness who was deceased at time of subsequent trial
held permissible; in dictum, Court approved of dying declaration hearsay exception as unobjec-
tionable under the confrontation clause).
10 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 58, 63 (1980). The importance of face-to-face accusation was
stressed in the early case of Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895), in which the Court
stated that the primary purpose of the confrontation clause
was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits ... [from] being used ... in lieu of a
personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an
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accompanied by cross-examination. 1 Nevertheless, the clause was
not to be read literally; the Court had expessly sanctioned the use of
some hearsay evidence against an accused.22 Conversely, the Court
had rejected the argument that the confrontation clause incorporated
by reference the hearsay rule with all of its exceptions, both histori-
cal and modern, and the notion that an accused's constitutional
rights would be satisfied in all cases by cross-examination of any wit-
ness conveying an out-of-court statement.2 Thus, the hearsay rule
and the confrontation clause were not viewed as coextensive in their
application.2 '
In 1980, the Court wrote in Ohio v. Roberts25 that, although it had
opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness,
but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at
him, and judge by his demeanor on the stand and the manner in which he gives his
testimony whether he is worthy of belief.
Id. at 242-43. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970) (the "literal right to 'confront'
the witness at the time of trial . . . forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation
Clause"); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) ("The right to confrontation . . . includes
both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of
the witness.").
See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965) ("Our cases construing the clause hold
that a primary interest secured by it is the right of cross-examination."); Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400, 404 (1965) ("[t]he right of cross-examination is included in the right of an accused in
a criminal case to confront the witnesses against him.").
" Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 402 (1972) (prior trial testimony of witness who was residing
in a foreign country at time of second trial); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (declarations
of a co-conspirator); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) (prior trial testimony of
witness who was deceased at time of second trial).
" In California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), the Court observed that the hearsay rule and
the confrontation clause were designed to protect similar values, but denied "that the overlap is
complete and that the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a codification of the
rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at common law." Id. at 155.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Accord Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970) (con-
frontation clause and hearsay rule "stem from the same roots" but are not equivalent). Justice
Harlan, in contrast, endorsed the view advocated by Dean Wigmpre, 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note
2, § 1397, that the confrontation clause places no limits on the type of evidence admissible
pursuant to a hearsay exception, and that the right of confrontation is satisfied if the accused is
able to cross-examine those witnesses who testify against him at trial. Dutton v. Evans, 400
U.S. 74, 94-97 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan concluded that the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments are better suited than the confrontation clause
for the task of policing fairness in the use of hearsay evidence. Id. at 96-97.
4 Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 81-82 (1970).
"5 448 U.S. 56 (1980). Roberts involved the admissibility of testimony given at a preliminary
hearing at which the witness, called and questioned by the defendant, made damaging state-
ments about the defendant. At trial, the prosecution showed that several subpoenas had proved
fruitless in producing this witness for trial and was thereupon permitted to introduce the prior
testimony. Id. at 59-60. The Court held that defendant's confrontation rights were not violated.
Id. at 67-77. The prior testimony bore sufficient "indicia of reliability" because defense counsel
had had adequate opportunity for adverse questioning during the preliminary hearing, and the
prosecution had satisfied its burden of showing the witness' unavailability. Id. See infra notes
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not previously defined a theory for determining the constitutionality
of hearsay exceptions, "a general approach to the problem [was] dis-
cernible. '22 The Court identified the confrontation-hearsay conflict as
one pitting the accused's interests in face-to-face confrontation and
cross-examination against the state's interests in effective law en-
forcement and the precise formulation of evidence rules in criminal
cases.2 7 The "general approach" to be followed in accommodating
these competing interests is embodied in a two-part inquiry into the
necessity and reliability of the hearsay evidence. 8 First, the prosecu-
tion generally must demonstrate the unavailability of the declarant
whose statement will be offered against the accused.' Second, the
government must show that the evidence bears adequate "indicia of
reliability."' 0 In an apparent attempt to provide direction to trial
courts faced with deciding whether application of a particular hear-
say exception passes the "indicia of reliability" test, the Court held
that reliability may be "inferred . . .where the evidence falls within
a firmly-rooted hearsay exception." 1 By way of example, the Court
mentioned in a footnote that public records, business records, dying
declarations, and cross-examined prior testimony32 all "rest upon
such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence
within them comports with the 'substance of the constitutional
protection.' ,"
29-33 and accompanying text.
" Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64-65.
27 Id. at 64.
8 Id. at 65. Although the Court in previous cases had disavowed a congruence between the
hearsay rule and the confrontation clause, see supra note 23 and accompanying text, the two
criteria by which compliance with the confrontation clause is t6 be judged-necessity and relia-
bility-are the same two factors identified by Dean Wigmore as justifying the common-law
hearsay exceptions. See supra note 3.
29 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65. The requirement that the prosecution generally must
either produce or demonstrate the unavailability of the declarant was said to conform to the
framers' "preference for face-to-face accusation." Id.
30 Id. Thus, even upon a showing that the declarant is unavailable, to be admissible his state-
ment must bear adequate indicia of reliability. Id. at 66. The second requirement is based on
that aspect of the confrontation clause which seeks to ensure accuracy by giving the defendant
"an effective means to test adverse evidence." Id. at 65. The reliability requirement is intended
to provide a rough substitute for the truth-finding function of courtroom testimony and cross-
examintion. Id.
31 Id. at 66.
2 Id. at 66 n.8.
" Id. at 66 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)). The Court's endorse-
ment of traditional hearsay exceptions was said to reflect the "truism" that the hearsay rule
and the confrontation clause were designed to protect similar values. Id. at 66. "It also responds
to the need for certainty in the workaday world of conducting criminal trials." Id. See supra
note 27 and accompanying text.
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Although the Roberts Court apparently viewed public records as
generally reliable, it did not state how the first prong of the test-the
unavailability requirement-would apply to the public records excep-
tion. As noted above, the unavailability of the officer who prepared a
public record is not generally required as a condition to its admissi-
bility."' To satisfy the Constitution, must the government always pro-
duce the maker of the record or prove to the satisfaction of the court
that the maker is unavailable? In a footnote, the Court answered this
question in the negative, stating that unavailability is not always a
constitutional prerequisite. 8 Dutton v. Evans," was cited as an exam-
ple of a case in which "the Court found the utility of trial confronta-
tion so remote that it did not require the prosecution to produce a
seemingly available witness.""7 In Dutton, the "utility" of confronta-
tion had been measured by the extent to which cross-examination
"could conceivably have shown the jury that the statement ...
might have been unreliable."" Based on Roberts' reference to Dut-
ton, it would seem that in the case of a public record the government
would not be required to show the unavailability of its author where
the inherent reliability of the evidence is so strong as to make the
"utility" of his courtroom appearance "remote."3 9
04 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
86 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 n.7.
36 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
s' Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 n.7.
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. at 89. The defendant Evans was prosecuted in a Georgia state
court for the murder of three policemen. Id. at 76. A co-conspirator, Williams, was similarly
charged but was tried separately. Id. Upon returning to his cell after arraignment, Williams
allegedly said to a fellow prisoner, "If it hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans,
we wouldn't be in this now." Id. at 77. At Evans' trial, the prosecution offered the testimony of
the prisoner who heard Williams' statement. Id. at 77-78. The state court admitted the evi-
dence on the issue of Evans' participation in the murder, id. at 78, and the Supreme Court
found no violation of the confrontation clause. Id. at 87-90.
Justice Stewart, writing for a plurality of four justices, noted that the prisoner who testified
to having heard Williams' statement was fully cross-examined, thereby providing the defendant
with a means of testing whether the statement was actually made and satisfying the right of
confrontation on that issue. Id. at 88-89. The plurality then identified several factors bearing
upon the reliability of Williams' statement: Williams had no apparent motive to lie to a fellow
prisoner; the statement was spontaneous and against Williams' penal interest; it did not make
an express assertion about a past fact, i.e., it was ambiguous on its face, and therefore was
unlikely to be given undue weight by the jury; Williams had personal knowledge of the identity
and role of the other participants in the crime; and the possibility of faulty recollection by
Williams was extremely unlikely. Id. The plurality found that "[t]hese are indicia of reliability
which have been widely viewed as determinative of whether a statement may be placed before
the jury though there is no confrontation of the declarant." Id. at 89. In addition, it was found
that "the possibility that cross-examination of Williams could conceivably have shown the jury
that the statement, though made, might have been unreliable was wholly unreal." Id.
" Conversely, if the reliability of the statement were marginal, a showing of the actual un-
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The inherent reliability of a hearsay statement has thus been iden-
tified as the most important factor in determining its admissibility
under the constitutional test. In all cases, the statement must bear
adequate "indicia of reliability"; if it is reliable enough to render
cross-examination at trial of little value in casting doubt on its relia-
bility, the prosecution need not show that the declarant is
unavailable.
Since Roberts cited public records as one of the "firmly-rooted"
hearsay exceptions entitled to an "inference" of reliability, 40 it might
appear that Congress unnecessarily limited the scope of rule 803(8)
by prohibiting the use of reports of observations by law enforcement
officers and findings of fact by government agencies. The Court's
broad language, however, should not be read as a blanket endorse-
ment of the public records exception, for the inference of reliability
would surely be subject to rebuttal in particular cases. In effect, Con-
gress' exclusion of police reports and investigatory fact-findings re-
versed the presumption of reliability that these reports might other-
wise possess. The congressional debates shed further light on the
availability of the author would be required. It is not altogether clear, however, that reliability
and a finding that cross-examination would be fruitless are the sole criteria for determining
that the prosecution need not show the unavailability of the declarant. Much of Justice Stew-
art's opinion in Dutton was devoted to distinguishing prior cases such as Douglas v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 415 (1965), Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), and Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719
(1968), on the grounds that in those cases the evidence was either "crucial" to the prosecution
or "devastating" to the defense, whereas in Dutton, the co-conspirator's statement was "of pe-
ripheral significance at most." Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. at 87. Some commentators have sug-
gested that Justice Stewart intended to introduce the relative importance of the hearsay as an
additional factor in determining the constitutionality of its admission. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, supra note 4, V 800[04], at 800-24 to -25; Note, Right of Confrontation: Admissibility
of Declaration by Co-conspirator, 85 HARV. L. REV. 188, 197-98 (1971). Roberts, which dealt
with an unavailable witness, see supra note 25, nowhere mentions the crucial or devastating
nature of evidence as having any bearing on the constitutional issue. If the declarant were
apparently available, however, as in Dutton, would the prosecution still have to show that the
proffered evidence, although reliable, was not crucial? Under such an approach, the admissibil-
ity of crucial hearsay evidence would turn on necessity. The prosecution would have to either
produce the declarant or satisfactorily explain his absence. Graham, The Right of Confronta-
tion and the Hearsay Rule, supra note 18, at 129.
It has been argued, however, that Justice Stewart's language concerning the "peripheral sig-
nificance" of the hearsay evidence in Dutton can and should be read merely as an expression
that the evidence was harmless error at most. Graham, The Forgetful Witness, supra note 18,
at 186. The plurality opinion stressed that a total of twenty witnesses testified for the prosecu-
tion, one of whom was an eyewitness to the homicide. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. at 87. Never-
theless, a few courts have held that with respect to an out-of-court statement made by an
available declarant who has not been produced, the relative importance of the statement on the
issue of the defendant's guilt must be taken into account. See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 554
S.W.2d 117, 122 (Tenn. 1977) (prosecutor not allowed to prove an essential element of a drug
crime solely by a chemist's report).
40 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 & n.8.
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purpose and intended scope of the exclusions.
B. Legislative History
Congress had no apparent difficulty in accepting the drafters' ex-
clusion in rule 803(8)(C) of investigatory factual findings from use
against defendants in criminal cases since the congressional reports
and debates do not elaborate on this point. The Advisory Commit-
tee's Note to subdivision (C) states that "evaluative reports" were
made inadmissible against the accused in criminal cases "in view of
the almost certain collision with confrontation rights which would re-
sult" from such use.4'
With respect to subdivision (B), the legislative history reveals a
greater difference of opinion among the lawmakers. As originally
drafted, this subdivision contained no exclusion for the use of reports
by law enforcement personnel in criminal actions.4 The exclusion
was proposed on the floor of the House by Representative Dennis,
who advocated that the prosecution should be required to call the
"policeman on the beat" in order to give the defendant an opportu-
nity for cross-examination.48 Without specifically citing the sixth
amendment confrontation clause, Mr. Dennis urged that "the defen-
dant should be confronted with the accuser. ' 44 Representative
Brasco, echoing this concern, argued that the exclusion was necessary
in order to avoid the situation whereby "the prosecution could use [a
policeman's report] to prove its case in chief with the possibility of
no other evidence being presented. ' 45 It was suggested by Represen-
tative Smith that a police report should be admissible if the police-
man became unavailable to testify at the trial." In response, Repre-
sentative Brasco expressed concern over a scenario in which a police
officer's report "that he saw Mr. X with a gun" would be admissible
if the officer thereafter became unavailable and the "statement could
be used in a criminal trial against Mr. X without the defense attor-
ney having the opportunity to cross-examine the officer. 4 7 Represen-
tative Dennis maintained that the proposed amendment to the rule
4 FED. R. EvID. 803(8)(C) advisory committee note.
42 Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 803(8)(B), 51 F.R.D. 315, 420 (Revised Draft
1971).
43 120 CONG. REC. 2387-88 (1974).
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would remove such a possibility.'
The report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary articulated
the rationale for the exclusion added by the House:
Ostensibly, the reason for this exclusion is that observations by police
officers at the scene of the crime or the apprehension of the defendant
are not as reliable as observations by public officials in other cases be-
cause of the adversarial nature of the confrontation between the police
and the defendant in criminal cases.49
Although the Senate Committee accepted the House amendment, it
proposed a separate hearsay exception for the recorded observations
of police officers who are unavailable to testify in court because of
death, incapacity, or similar reasons.50 The Conference Report re-
jected the Senate proposal, 1 which resulted in congressional adop-
tion of the current version of rule 803(8)(B). During the final debate
on the floor of the House, Representative Holtzman expressed fear
that police reports might still qualify under one of the "catchall" ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule in the event that a policeman was un-
available.52 Representative Dennis responded that such a possibility
was precluded by the Conference Report's explicit rejection of the
Senate-proposed addition to the rules."'
In sum, Congress sought to exclude on-the-scene crime reports by
law enforcement officers and evaluative reports resulting from gov-
ernment investigations because of the danger that their admission
would abridge the defendant's right of confrontation. The question of
the extent to which the admissibility of such reports has the poten-
tial for violating this right is answered in the Senate Report's sugges-
48 Id.
4 S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 7051, 7064 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
50 Id. The Senate Committee's proposed rule would have been numbered 804(b)(5). Id.
"' CONFERENCE REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7098, 7106.
51 120 CONG. REC. 40,893, 40,895 (1974). Representative Holtzman feared that Federal Rule
of Evidence 804(b)(5) would open a "back door" to admit police reports, thereby undermining
the Conference Committee's rejection of the Senate-proposed exception for the reports of un-
available policemen. 120 CONO. REc. 40,893 (1974). Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5), com-
monly called a "residual" or "catchall" exception, permits hearsay not falling within a specific
exception to be admitted if the declarant is shown to be unavailable, the statement possesses
"circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" equivalent to those of the various specific excep-
tions, the evidence relates to a material fact, other evidence of more probative value cannot
reasonably be procured, the interests of justice will be served, and prior notice of the intended
use is given to the adversary. Id. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24) contains identical language
but eliminates the unavailability requirement.
53 120 CONG. REC. 40,895 (1974).
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tion that the recorded observations of criminal activity by law en-
forcement officers are of doubtful reliability because of their
adversarial bias.5' The same defect inheres in fact-findings resulting
from government investigations of potential criminal defendants. Ad-
ditionally, fact-findings may be of questionable reliability if they con-
tain subjective opinions or are based on multiple layers of hearsay.55
Indeed, Congress seems to have recognized that such records are
prima facie unreliable as evidence against the accused, at least in
part because they are prepared with an eye toward litigation and are
tainted by prosecutorial bias. Exclusion may be appropriate, there-
fore, for the same reason that documents are objectionable under the
"litigation-records" doctrine of Palmer v. Hoffman.5 An analysis of
this doctrine may provide an additional conceptual frame of refer-
ence for determining the scope of rule 803(8)'s exclusions.
" See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
" Traditional judicial views on investigatory reports are summarized in Commonwealth v.
Slavski, 245 Mass. 405, 140 N.E. 465 (1923), where it was stated that public records consisting
of investigations and inquiries conducted by public officers "concerning causes and effects and
involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, expressions of opinion, and making conclu-
sions" are generally inadmissible. Id. at 417, 140 N.E. at 469. Such reports may contain evalua-
tive opinions by persons lacking proper qualifying credentials. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
supra note 4, 1 803(8)[03], at 803-201. Furthermore, the reliability of investigatory reports
would be particularly questionable if they were not based upon the personal knowledge of the
author or upon information provided by his subordinates or other persons under a public duty
to provide the information. See, e.g., Rusecki v. State, 56 Wis. 2d 299, 316, 201 N.W.2d 832,
840-41 (1972) (social worker's report that child had illegally run away from home inadmissible
in juvenile delinquency proceeding because it was based solely on information provided by
child's parents). Admission of such reports in a criminal case would come very close to creating
the spectre of a prosecution based on ex parte affidavits, which the confrontation clause was
clearly intended to prevent. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895); Kay v.
United States, 255 F.2d 476, 480 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 825 (1958); supra note 20.
In civil cases, on the other hand, the foregoing objections to the admissibility of investigatory
reports have been met by arguments that such reports are sufficiently reliable to overcome the
absence of first-hand knowledge. This is because of the presumed care with which the public
official will evaluate the accuracy of the data he receives and because these reports are prepared
in a timely fashion in respect to the events in question. McCormick, supra note 4, at 364-65.
Additionally, it is argued that problems of bias and the qualifications of the investigator can be
met on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 365. In accordance with the latter view, rule 803(8)(C) per-
mits admission of investigative reports in civil actions unless the judge concludes in a particular
case that the sources of information or the circumstances under which the report was made
render it untrustworthy. "[T]he rule . . . assumes admissibility in the first instance but with
ample provision for escape if sufficient negative factors are present." FED. R. EvID. 803(8)(C)
advisory committee note. See generally Young, The Use of Public Records and Reports as
Trial Evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 3 AM. J. TRIAL ADV. 381 (1980); Note,
The Trustworthiness of Government Evaluative Reports Under Federal Rule of Evidence
803(8)(C), 96 HARv. L. REV. 492 (1982); Note, The Admissibility of Evaluative Reports Under
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8), 68 Ky. L.J. 197 (1979); Note, The Scope of Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(8)(C), 59 TEx. L. REV. 155 (1980).
318 U.S. 109 (1943).
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C. The Palmer Doctrine
The Supreme Court's decision in Palmer v. Hoffman"' introduced
to the jurisprudence of the private business records hearsay excep-
tion the notion that reports prepared by a party or his agents in con-
templation of litigation are inherently unreliable because of the
maker's natural bias and motive to misrepresent. Palmer was a per-
sonal injury and wrongful death action in which the defendant rail-
road sought to introduce an accident report made by its employee
prior to his death. 8 The Court held the report inadmissible because
it was "calculated for use essentially in the court '" and therefore was
not made in the "regular course" of the railroad's business;60 its "pri-
mary use [was] in litigating, not in railroading." '61 Most authorities
seem to agree that the underlying reason for the Court's exclusion of
the accident report was that it lacked the same quality of trustwor-
thiness that characterizes a routine business report made in the ab-
sence of contemplated use in litigation.62 Under this rationale, it is
often appropriate to exclude both private and public records made in
anticipation of litigation when offered in support of the party respon-
sible for making the record. 3 This is not to suggest that records
67 Id.
68 Id. at 111.
59 Id. at 114.
60 Id. at 111.
I' Id. at 114.
62 United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957, 965-66 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Leon v. Penn Central Co.,
428 F.2d 528, 530 (7th Cir. 1970); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, §§ 723-24; 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, supra note 4, 803(6)[07], at 803-173 to -174. The report in question in Palmer had
been excluded by the court of appeals because it was "dripping with motivations to misrepre-
sent." Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 991 (2d Cir. 1942), aff'd, 318 U.S. 109 (1943). The
Palmer principle was incorporated in the last phrase of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), which
provides that business records should be excluded if "the source of information or other cir-
cumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness." Id. See J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 4,
1 803(6)[07], at 803-175. Similar language is contained in rule 803(8)(C).
" Admissibility generally turns upon whether the report is being offered by or against the
party responsible for its preparation. Although reliability is doubtful when a self-serving litiga-
tion report is offered in support of the author's position, it is enhanced when the report con-
tains statements damaging to the author's position. Since such statements are akin to declara-
tions against interest and party admissions, it is reasonable to permit the adversary to
introduce litigation records against the party who made them. See, e.g., Yates v. Bair Trans-
port, Inc., 249 F. Supp. 681, 690-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (plaintiff in personal injury action was not
allowed to introduce medical reports prepared by his treating physicians because they were
self-serving and made in anticipation of litigation "to shore up his own case"S; whereas reports
of plaintiffs condition made by defendants' doctors were deemed sufficiently trustworthy be-
cause they were offered by the plaintiff); Levy-Zentner Co. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 74
Cal. App. 3d 762, 783-86, 142 Cal. Rptr. 1, 15-17 (1977) (fire accident report made by defendant
corporation held admissible against defendant). It was this reasoning which led the court in
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should be excluded merely because at the time of their making there
was a potential for their use in litigation. Palmer dictates exclusion
for lack of reliability only when the report is made under circum-
stances in which the potential for litigation is known to the maker
and he has both an opportunity and a motive, conscious or uncon-
scious, to falsify or color the facts.6 4
Police reports and government investigatory fact-findings describ-
ing criminal conduct, which might otherwise qualify for the business
or public records hearsay exceptions, may thus be excluded in crimi-
nal proceedings under the Palmer doctrine." Many such records are
intrinsically linked to litigation by the government. In addition, they
are prepared by persons who can be presumed to favor the govern-
ment's adversarial posture. Therefore, if at the time of its making
there could have been a motive and opportunity to falsify or color the
facts in order to favor the government's position in criminal litiga-
tion, the accuracy of a police or investigatory record is suspect."
It can be argued that the admissibility of party-prepared reports
should not be defeated on the ground of bias, because the factfinder
will naturally be skeptical of the truth of such an obviously self-serv-
United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1975), to conclude that police reports excluded
by rule 803(8)(B) may be offered by the defendant even though they may not be used on behalf
of the government. Id. at 967-68. See supra note 11.
" See, e.g., Bracey v. Herringa, 466 F.2d 702, 704 (7th Cir. 1972) (in civil action by prisoners
against prison guards alleging mistreatment, guards' records and logs describing plaintiffs' be-
havior were inadmissible on guards' behalf because of likelihood that such records would have
been prepared in contemplation of future lawsuits).
" Adversarial bias would not ordinarily be present with respect to a government record of-
fered in civil litigation involving two private parties since the report was not prepared by either
party. See Note, The Admissibility of Police Reports Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 71
Nw. U.L. REV. 691, 693-94 (1976). For example, in accident cases, either party may be able to
introduce a policeman's report describing the accident, assuming all other requirements for
admission of such a report are satisfied. See, e.g., Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551
(6th Cir. 1978) (upholding, under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C), defendant's introduction
of report containing policeman's conclusion that plaintiff ran a red light based on policeman's
subsequent observation of the accident scene and interview of defendant), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 933 (1979).
" Courts which have applied the underlying reasoning of Palmer to reports prepared by or
on behalf of the government and offered by the prosecution against criminal defendants include
United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957, 965-67 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (police records); United States v.
Ware, 247 F.2d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 1957) (narcotics agent's description of drug purchase); Hart-
zog v. United States, 217 F.2d 706, 709-10 (4th Cir. 1954) (IRS worksheets); Stewart v. State,
246 Ga. 70, 76, 268 S.E.2d 906, 911 (1980) (summary of private employer's payroll records pre-
pared for welfare agency for use in investigation and litigation); State v. Henderson, 554 S.W.2d
117, 120 (Tenn. 1977) (toxicologist's report prepared by police crime laboratory). But see In re
Nelson R., 83 Misc. 2d 1081, 1083-84, 374 N.Y.S.2d 982, 984-86 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1975) (Palmer
has no applicability to a police ballistics report concerning the operability of a firearm).
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ing document and would therefore give it little weight.6 7 In litigation
involving monetary or other non-penal interests, a jury might very
well be inclined to discount the accuracy of a party's own report of
the matter. In criminal litigation, however, the danger exists that
records prepared by government agents which bear the official impri-
matur of the government itself will be unduly persuasive.6 8 Further-
more, because of the interests at stake in a criminal trial, society has
demanded a high degree of accuracy in the fact-finding process,6 9
making it particularly appropriate to exclude evidence of dubious
reliability.7 °
Thus, Congress acted in accordance with both the confrontation
clause and the Palmer doctrine in excluding against criminal defen-
dants, as a general rule, the use of written reports prepared by the
government specifically with an eye toward prosecution. Rule 803(8)
thereby advances the goals of reliability and fairness in the use of
public records in criminal trials. As noted at the outset, however,
problems remain concerning the proper scope of rule 803(8)'s exclu-
sions. Among these are whether the exclusions should be given literal
effect, whether other hearsay exceptions may be utilized when rule
803(8) forecloses admissibility, whether live testimony by the author
of an objectionable record should affect its admissibility, and whether
an expert witness may properly render an opinion on the basis of
such a record. In addressing these problems, courts should be guided
by the legislative history of rule 803(8), the Palmer doctrine, and the
confrontation clause. The remainder of this Article will show that
under such analysis the result need not be the exclusion of all reports
prepared by law enforcement officers and government factfinders.
" See G. LILLY, supra note 2, at 240-41.
" Cf. United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 235 (2d Cir. 1978) ("The more official and au-
thoritative a writing appears to be, the less likely it is that even cautious or cynical individuals
will be able to resist the temptation to regard the accuracy of the contents of the document as
being beyond reproach.").
' See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970).
70 See State v. Taylor, 46 N.J. 316, 332, 217 A.2d 1, 10 ("In a criminal case . a court
should be reluctant to broaden the scope of an exception to the hearsay rule unless the type of
statement sought to be admitted carries with it strong and convincing indicia of trustworthi-
ness."), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 855 (1966).
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II. THE SCOPE OF RULE 803(8)'s EXCLUSIONS
A. "Matters Observed" by Law Enforcement Officers
Courts are divided concerning the question whether the exclusion-
ary language of rule 803(8)(B) should be given a literal interpretation
so as to encompass all records of matters observed by law enforce-
ment officers." The court in United States v. Ruffin" appears to
7 The exclusion in rule 803(8)(B) may be avoided in some cases, of course, if the officials
who made the record in question do not fall within the definition of police or "other law en-
forcement personnel." For example, United States v. Hansen, 583 F.2d 325 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 912 (1978), upheld the government's introduction of reports by city building
inspectors of violations and deficiencies in buildings which had been burned in an arson-insur-
ance fraud scheme, in part, because the court found that the inspectors had not been acting in
a law enforcement capacity. Id. at 333. Aside from its questionable characterization of the func-
tion of the building inspectors, the court appears to have overlooked rule 803(8)(C), which ex-
cludes investigatory fact-findings regardless of whether they were prepared by law enforcement
personnel.
Prior to adoption of the Federal Rules, a "'solid wall of authority,' " United States v. Lloyd,
431 F.2d 160, 163-64 (9th Cir. 1970) (quoting United States v. Scott, 425 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir.
1970)), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 911 (1971), approved the admissibility of reports by military of-
ficers, draft boards, and government employers to prove that particular persons did not report
for military or alternative civilian duty. See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 387 F.2d 781 (7th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 936 (1968); La Porte v. United States, 300 F.2d 878 (9th Cir.
1962); United States v. Ward, 173 F.2d 628 (2d Cir. 1949). One such case, United States v. Van
Hook, 284 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1960), remanded for resentencing, 365 U.S. 609 (1961), was cited
by the Advisory Committee as an example of the intended scope of rule 803(8)(B). FED. R.
EvID. 803(8)(B) advisory committee note. Would such reports, however, fall within the exclu-
sionary language added by Congress on the ground that military officers or selective service
personnel constitute law enforcement officials? The answer is probably no, since congressional
history reveals no intent to change the result of such cases. See supra notes 41-53 and accom-
panying text.
Challenges to the introduction of selective service files on confrontation grounds have been
uniformly rejected by the courts. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 454 F.2d 373, 375-76
(10th Cir. 1972); Kemp v. United States, 415 F.2d 1185, 1186-87 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 969 (1970); United States v. Holmes, 387 F.2d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 936 (1968). But see United States v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1046, 1048-49 (9th Cir.
1973) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting), vacated, 415 U.S. 971 (1974). Scholars have expressed diver-
gent points of view. Compare Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule,
supra note 18, at 131 n.158 (case where the government's only evidence consisted of the defen-
dant's selective service file described as "the All-Time Confrontation Hall of Horrors") with
Griswold, The Due Process Revolution and Confrontation, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 711, 726 (1971)
(presentation of selective service file properly shifts burden of producing contradictory evidence
to the defendant). The results of the selective service cases are acceptable for the most part
since a person's appearance or non-appearance at-a particular time and place is essentially an
objective fact presenting little opportunity for fabrication. See infra notes 88-96 and accompa-
nying text. But see United States v. Webb, 467 F.2d 1041, 1042-43 (7th Cir. 1972) (military
officer's letter that defendant had refused induction was insufficient to sustain conviction where
defendant disputed the officer's version of the events that transpired at the induction center).
United States v. Hudson, 479 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1012 (1973),
however, is troubling because the defendant's failure to report for induction was established by
Public Records Hearsay Exception
have adopted the literal approach. The defendant was charged with
income tax evasion and filing false returns both personally and on
behalf of a corporation he controlled.73 One of the issues was whether
the defendant had filed a return for the corporation in 1972.7" The
government offered an IRS computer printout with a coded notation
that at some unspecified time in the past the defendant had con-
tacted the IRS and stated to an unidentified IRS official that the
corporation was not required to file for 1972." The court held that
the printouts were inadmissible under rule 803(8)(B) because "IRS
personnel who gather data and information and commit that infor-
mation to records which are routinely used in criminal prosecutions
are performing what can legitimately be characterized as a law en-
forcement function.
76
In contrast to Ruffin's all-encompassing approach, other courts
have taken the position that the exclusionary language of rule
803(8)(B) may be given a flexible reading without contravening the
specific congressional intent underlying the section. For example, in
United States v. Orozco,7 a prosecution for possession of drugs, an
issue at trial was the credibility of one of the defendants who con-
tended that she had been using her automobile on the night in ques-
tion for social purposes in Los Angeles.78 In rebuttal the government
offered computer data cards from the Treasury Enforcement Com-
munications System (TECS), showing that on that night a customs
inspector had recorded the license plate of the defendant's car as the
car crossed the Mexican border .7  The Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals found that the computer cards qualified for admission under
subdivision (B). 80 Emphasizing that the purpose for the exclusion of
evidence under subdivision (B) was the unreliability of observations
an anonymous entry in the government's file. Id. at 253. At minimum, the government should
show that such a report was based on information provided by identifiable officials in order to
provide a proper basis for evaluating its reliability. See id. at 255-57 (Lumbard, J., dissenting);
infra note 131.
72 575 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1978).
71 Id. at 349.
71 Id. at 356.
" Id. at 355.
" Id. at 356. The court concluded, however, that admission of the printouts was harmless
error because the defendant was not ultimately convicted of the charge involving the corpora-
tion's failure to file in 1972. Id.
77 590 F.2d 789 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 920 (1979).
78 Id. at 791-92.
70 Id.
80 Id. at 793. The district court had admitted the data pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence
803(6), the general business records provision. The court of appeals, in contrast, held that rule
803(8) was the applicable rule. Id.
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made by law enforcement officials at the scene of a crime, the court
found that "Congress did not intend to exclude records of routine,
nonadversarial matters such as those in question here. ' 81 The cus-
toms officer's "simple recordation of license numbers of all vehicles
which pass the station" was viewed as a neutral, nonconfrontational
observation in which the official's perception would not be clouded. 2
The Orozco court relied, in part, on United States v. Grady,83
which had utilized a similar analysis in holding that "routine
records" of an inventory of serial numbers on rifles found in North-
ern Ireland and prepared by the local police authorities could be of-
fered against a defendant in the United States accused of illegal fire-
arms shipments to that troubled area .8  The Grady court held that
admission of such reports would not contravene congressional intent
because they were distinguishable from "police officers' reports of
their contemporaneous observations of the crime" through which
prosecutors might attempt to prove their cases in chief.85
Regardless of the courts' resolutions, the reports at issue in Ruffin,
Orozco, and Grady all involved matters that were objective in nature,
requiring no evaluative conclusions or interpretations. In addition,
the matters observed and recorded involved no accusations of crimi-
nal activity against particular individuals. Further, they were pre-
pared by persons with first-hand knowledge close in time to the oc-
currence of the events being recorded. Such reports bear the same
earmarks of reliability that justify public records in general as a hear-
say exception. 6
The Orozco-Grady interpretation of rule 803(8)(B) is preferable to
the blanket exclusionary approach of Ruffin because it allows for the
admission of reliable government records while at the same time it
81 Id.
82 Id.
" 544 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1976).
" Id. at 604.
88 Id.
*6 See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text. There is no requirement in the text of rule
803(8), unlike that of rule 803(6), that a public record, to be admissible, must have been made
at or near the time of the event recorded. There can be little doubt, however, that such a
showing would enhance the accuracy of the report since the officer's memory would have been
fresh at the time of its preparation. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, at 364-65; cf. C. McCoR-
MICK, supra note 1, § 49, at 105 n.88, § 303, at 715 (hearsay exception for past recollection
recorded and use of prior consistent statements reliable because statements were made at a
time when recollection was fresh and clear). It is appropriate to impose a contemporaneity
requirement on the admissibility of public records in criminal cases in order to enhance the
reliability of such evidence. See, e.g., State v. Kreck, 86 Wash. 2d 112, 119, 542 P.2d 782, 787
(1975) (requirement that crime laboratory report be made near in time to test insures against
inaccuracy due to lapse of memory).
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preserves the underlying congressional intent to preclude the prose-
cution's use of out-of-court statements of an official accuser, such as
the "policeman on the beat" who "made a report that he saw Mr. X
with a gun."87 The systematic notation of all license plates of cars
crossing the border,88 the recording of a taxpayer's telephone call in
the ordinary course of government business,8 9 the making of an in-
ventory of rifle serial numbers,90 and similar ministerial reports con-
cerning objective facts91 fall outside the concerns of the Congressmen
8 See supra notes 43-53 and accompanying text. Reports by undercover narcotics agents
describing the details of drug purchases from particular suspects would seem to exemplify what
Congress intended to exclude as matters observed by law enforcement officers. For example,
United States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1957), held that agents' notations on lock-seal
envelopes containing suspected narcotics "lack the necessary earmarks of reliability and trust-
worthiness." Id. at 700. Applying Palmer's "litigation-motivation" test, see supra notes 57-70
and accompanying text, Ware found that "such utility as they possess relates primarily to pros-
ecution of suspected law breakers and only incidentally to the systematic conduct of the police
business." United States v. Ware, 247 F.2d at 700. Accord United States v. Frattini, 501 F.2d
1234, 1235-36 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Brown, 451 F.2d 1231, 1234 (5th Cir. 1971);
Sanchez v. United States, 293 F.2d 260, 267-70 (8th Cir. 1961); State v. Garvey, 283 N.W.2d
153, 155-57 (N.D. 1979).
United States v. Cain, 615 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1980), also reached a result which comports
with the proper scope of rule 803(8)(B). In a prosecution for interstate transportation of a
stolen vehicle, the district court allowed the government to introduce an escape report made at
a federal prison recording the defendant's escape on the date the vehicle was reported stolen.
The court of appeals reversed, reasoning that rule 803(8) establishes a rule of absolute exclu-
sion. Id. at 382. The decision is justified on its facts, because the escape report recorded the
prison officials' observations concerning the defendant's crime of escape, the date, time, and
circumstances of which would be significant with respect to the feasibility of his having com-
mitted the subsequent crimes. Cross-examination of the prison guards responsible for the re-
port would be necessary to test its reliability. See also State v. Miller, 42 Ohio St. 2d 102, 326
N.E.2d 259 (1975) (probation officer's report offered against defendant during revocation hear-
ing was error in absence of appearance by the officer).
88 See United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 589 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 920 (1979).
8 See United States v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1978). To be distinguished from the IRS
records at issue in Ruffin are those which were properly excluded in Hartzog v. United States,
217 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1954). Hartzog held that, in a prosecution for income tax evasion, it was
error for the trial court to have admitted IRS worksheets in which defendant's documents,
which had been observed by IRS agents during an investigatory interview with him, were classi-
fied under various categories of income and deductions. Id. at 708-10. The worksheets had been
prepared specifically for the purpose of prosecuting the defendant. Id. at 708.
1o See United States v. Grady, 544 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1976). A different result might have
been appropriate in Grady if, prior to taking an inventory of the rifles received in Northern
Ireland, the foreign police authorities had received a list from United States authorities of the
serial numbers of defendant's rifles. In such case, there would have been motive and opportu-
nity for the Northern Irish police to fabricate the inventory so as to correspond with the list
provided by the United States. Upon such a showing, the trustworthiness of the inventory
would be doubtful.
91 E.g., United States v. Hernandez-Rojas, 617 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir.) (in prosecution of
alien for illegal re-entry, government was permitted to establish prior deportation by warrant
containing dated notation by immigration officer of defendant's deportation to Mexico; report
was nonadversarial, objective, and reliable because of government's need to keep accurate
Albany Law Review [Vol. 47
who added the exclusion in rule 803(8)(B).11 A law enforcement offi-
cials' routine recording of objective data in a nonadversarial setting
should not be automatically excluded. In particular cases, of course,
the reliability of such records may be called into question despite the
absence of accusatory or evaluative content."3 For example, the court
may not be satisfied as to the accuracy of the methods by which the
observations were made, or the report on its face might show signs of
records of the movement of aliens), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 864 (1980); United States v. Fried-
man, 593 F.2d 109, 118 (9th Cir. 1979) (in prosecution for conspiracy to import cocaine, court
stated in dictum that Chilean immigration records of dates of defendants' entry into and exit
from Chile would be admissible under rule 803(8)); United States v. Union Nacional de
Trabajadores, 576 F.2d 388, 391 (1st Cir. 1978) (in criminal contempt proceeding for violation
of injunction, marshal's return stating that he had served the injunction held admissible; mar-
shal was acting in nonadversarial capacity); cf. Heike v. United States, 192 F.2d 83, 94-95 (2d
Cir. 1911) (entries in dock books by Assistant United States Weighers of weights of defendants'
cargoes admissible in prosecution for falsification of weights), a/I'd, 227 U.S. 131 (1913).
9' One commentator has suggested that routine reports like those in Orozco and Grady could
be classified as reports of "activities of the office or agency" under rule 803(8)(A), thereby obvi-
ating the need to carve out exceptions to the exclusion in rule 803(8)(B). M. GRAHAM, HAND-
BOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE 840-41 n.50 (1981). Under this analysis, it would appear that pre-
rules cases, such as United States v. Burruss, 418 F.2d 677 (4th Cir. 1969), would be decided
the same under rule 803(8). Burruss held that in a prosecution for interstate transportation of a
stolen vehicle, police records containing the vehicle owner's report of the theft were inadmissi-
ble to prove the fact of theft but were admissible to show that the vehicle had been reported
stolen. Id. at 678. The court's reasoning was that, as to the commission of the crime itself, the
police report contained only hearsay information provided by an informant under no employ-
ment-related duty to make such a report. Id. Accord United States v. Jacobson, 518 F.2d 1171,
1172 (8th Cir. 1975) (inadmissible if sole issue is fact of theft); United States v. Wolosyn, 411
F.2d 550, 551 (9th Cir. 1969) (admissible for confirming date on which car was reported stolen).
Cf. State v. Dahms, 310 N.W.2d 479, 481 (Minn. 1981) (police reports of stolen cars unreliable
because persons reporting theft may have agreed to have their cars stolen or torched to collect
insurance). See supra note 4. The police department's recording of the theft report, however,
would seem to qualify as one of the routine activities of the office, falling under rule 803(8)(A).
See United States v. King, 590 F.2d 253, 255 (8th Cir. 1978) (documents on file with a state's
department of revenue admissible to show defendant's ownership of a car), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 973 (1979).
93 The court in United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 920
(1979), took the position that routine, nonadversarial police records may be admitted unless
other circumstances suggest a lack of trustworthiness. Id. at 794. Although the concluding
trustworthiness provision in rule 803(8) appears on its face to modify only subdivision (C), cf.
Brown v. ASD Computing Center, 519 F. Supp. 1096, 1103 n.23 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (trustworthi-
ness proviso does not encompass subdivision (A)), it is appropriate to superimpose an overrid-
ing trustworthiness requirement on all of the subdivisions of rule 803(8) as the draftsmen ex-
pressly did in the case of private business records under rule 803(6). See S. SALTZBURG & K.
REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 579 (3d ed. 1982).
The Orozco court found no lack of trustworthiness in the computer records at issue in that
case. Their admission into evidence was preceded by testimony explaining the procedures by
which customs inspectors record license plate numbers and feed such data into computers.
United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d at 794. The court of appeals observed that the system used
had sufficient internal controls and that, under the circumstances, there had been no motive for
the officers to make false entries. Id.
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irregularity, such as additions or erasures, or that it was prepared at
a point in time remote to the events in question. In such a case, the
defendant would have a legitimate objection to the use of the
evidence.
The records permissible under the more flexible reading of rule
803(8)(B) would survive a Palmer analysis in most cases because of
their objective content and the absence of an adversarial posture. Al-
though it is arguable that all reports of observations made by law
enforcement officials are made in anticipation of litigation, their reli-
ability normally would be called into question only when the nature
of the data reported and the relationship of such data to particular
criminal suspects provides an opportunity for falsification. For the
same reasons, reports such as those in Orozco and Grady normally
should not be inadmissible under the confrontation clause. Because
of their objective, nonaccusatory content, the records would satisfy
the constitutional requirement of reliability," ' and the utility of
cross-examining the maker of the record would be minimal.9 5 Assum-
ing a proper foundation as to the regular and routine nature of the
circumstances under which the record was made, and no facial indi-
cia of irregularities, it is difficult to see how cross-examination would
be of any appreciable value in testing the record's reliability. 6
B. Investigatory Fact-findings: The Special Problem of Forensic
Reports
Under subdivision (C), there is little doubt that a written report of
an administrative agency's investigation, such as findings by the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission in connection with an alleged vio-
lation of the securities laws, would be inadmissible in a subsequent
criminal action against the persons involved. The subjective and ad-
versarial nature of such reports, together with the likelihood, in many
cases, that their contents will be based on multiple hearsay,97 would
See supra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
" Since it is unlikely that the public official would have an independent recollection of rou-
tine matters, inquiry into his perceptions and memory would be of little value. See supra note
8. The most that might be expected from the witness on the stand is a concession as to his
fallibility.
'7 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 571 F.2d 1354, 1356-60 (5th Cir. 1978) (in prosecution for
illegal receipt of a firearm shipped in interstate commerce, a federal agent's report containing
information as to origin of gun provided by out-of-state manufacturer held properly excludable
under rule 803(8)(C); report also inadmissible under rule 803(6)). See supra note 55.
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render them insufficiently reliable to satisfy the sixth amendment."
More controversial is the question whether government forensic re-
ports may be admitted under the rule. If such a report emanated
from a police laboratory, literal application of subdivision (B) would
appear to require its exclusion as a "matter observed" and, whether
it was produced in a law enforcement or any other government-oper-
ated laboratory, subdivision (C), on its face, would require its exclu-
sion as a finding based on an investigation authorized by law.
The problem with such an interpretation of rule 803(C), however,
is that prior to adoption of the Federal Rule, federal courts approved
the admissibility of certain types of laboratory reports under the bus-
iness records exception. 9 For example, in Kay v. United States,100
the Fourth Circuit sanctioned the introduction of a government
chemist's report showing the alcoholic content of the defendant's
blood in a prosecution for drunken driving on a federal parkway.10 1
In rejecting the contention that use of the report violated the defen-
dant's constitutional right of confrontation, the court observed that
alcoholic content of the blood "may be accurately determined by well
recognized chemical procedures. It is an objective fact, not a mere
expression of opinion ... ."102 It had also been held by some federal
courts that chemists' analyses of suspected narcotic substances were
admissible as business records. 10 3 In United States v. Parker,'" the
Eighth Circuit stressed the reliability of such reports and the regular-
ity with which the testing and recording of the results thereof are
usually made: "The making of the chemical analysis of the substance
in question is a part of the daily routine of the Bureau laboratory
"105
See supra note 41 and accompanying text. To the extent that a government agent's fact-
findings are not based on his own knowledge or that of his subordinates, the report would not
qualify as one of the "firmly-rooted" hearsay exceptions to which the Supreme Court would
attribute a presumption of reliability for confrontation purposes. See supra notes 31-33 and
accompanying text. The admissibility of fact-findings based on information provided by
nongovernment employees is of relatively recent vintage. See supra note 55.
" See supra note 10.
100 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 825 (1958).
Id. at 480-81.
102 Id. at 481. See also Commonwealth v. Slavski, 245 Mass. 405, 417, 140 N.E. 465, 469
(1923) (admission of state chemist's report concerning the percentage of alcohol in alleged li-
quor not violative of confrontation right because the analysis involved "ascertainment of fact
by well recognized scientific processes").
103 See, e.g., United States v. Frattini, 501 F.2d 1234, 1236 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v.
Ware, 247 F.2d 698, 699-700 (7th Cir. 1957).
, 4 491 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 989 (1974).
,01 Id. at 520-21.
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In 1977, in United States v. Oates,'0 e the Second Circuit reversed
the trend started by the previous cases by holding that, as a result of
the exclusionary language of rule 803(8), government laboratory re-
ports are inadmissible against criminal defendants, even if they oth-
erwise fall within the separate hearsay exception for business records
in rule 803(6).o7 In Oates, two persons were jointly charged with con-
spiracy and possession of heroin with intent to distribute.""8 At trial,
the Government was permitted to introduce the official report and
the handwritten worksheet of a chemist who analyzed the white pow-
der seized from one of the defendants by officers of the United States
Customs Service.109 The chemist, an employee in a laboratory oper-
ated by the Customs Service, was not called to testify at the trial,"°
but reports setting forth his conclusion that the substance was heroin
were introduced through another chemist who testified concerning
the chemical analyses, practices and procedures regularly utilized by
the Customs Service."' The court of appeals held that admission of
the chemist's report violated rule 803(8)(B) and (C)" 2 and that the
100 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977).
... Id. at 66-78.
"" Id. at 48 n.1.
'0 Id. at 63-64.
1 The trial record indicated that on the day of the trial the chemist telephoned the United
States Attorney's Office to advise of his unavailability. The Assistant United States Attorney in
charge of the case later called the chemist's home and spoke with his wife, who said that he was
ill. No further inquiries were made by the government. Id. at 64.
.. Id. The testifying chemist herself had performed hundreds of tests for the Customs Ser-
vice for the purpose of identifying heroin. Id. at 64-65. Although she had never worked with the
chemist who performed the test in question, she testified that she could ascertain from his
worksheet the steps he had taken to determine whether the substance was heroin. Id. at 64.
Upon defendant's objection to the introduction of the documents through this witness, the
govenment cited rules 803(6), 803(8) and 803(24) (residual exception) in support of admissibil-
ity. Id. at 64.
It might be argued that pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 703 (bases of opinion testi-
mony by experts need not be admissible in evidence "if of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions"), the chemist at trial could have rendered an
opinion that the substance was heroin based upon the data contained in the other chemist's
report regardless of its hearsay status. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 4,
803(6)[07], at 803-176 n.20. Rule 703, however, has been limited to cases in which the expert
has at least some personal knowledge of the matter in question. See infra notes 178-94 and
accompanying text. The chemist in Oates had no such knowledge. United States v. Oates, 560
F.2d at 65.
"S United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d at 66-68. The court had no difficulty in concluding that
the chemist's analysis was a "factual finding" and the product of an "investigation" which the
Customs Service was authorized by law to perform. Id. at 67. "Though with less confidence," id.
at 67, the court also concluded that the reports were "matters observed" by "law enforcement
personnel" because the Customs Service had "clearly defined law enforcement authority in the
field of illegal narcotics trafficking" and Customs Service chemists were "important participants
in the prosecutorial effort." Id. at 68 (footnote omitted). It is interesting to note that on appeal
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report could not qualify, in the alternative, as a business record.113
Addressing the government's contention that the chemist's report
qualified under rule 803(6), the text of which contains no automatic
exclusion in criminal cases, the court held that the rules must be read
in harmony with the specific legislative intent to make police reports
and government factual findings "absolutely inadmissible" against
criminal defendants." 4 The court relied principally upon remarks
made by Representative Hungate in presenting the report of the
Committee of Conference to the House: "As the rules of evidence
now stand, police and law enforcement reports are not admissible
against defendants in criminal cases. This is made quite clear by the
provisions of rule 803(8)(B) and (C)." 5 These remarks were viewed
by the court as establishing a legislative intent to make rule 803(8)
"comprehensively all-encompassing '' 6 with respect to police reports
and government factual findings so that they would be "similarly dis-
qualified under any exception to the hearsay rule.""' 7 Despite the ab-
sence of any exclusionary language concerning such reports in rule
803(6),"18 the court held that the business records provision should
the government did not attempt to justify admissibility of the evidence pursuant to rule 803(8)
or rule 803(24), but chose instead to rely solely upon rule 803(6), the business records excep-
tion. Id. at 66, 72-74. Its decision to forego reliance upon rule 803(24) is understandable in view
of its failure to meet the pretrial notification requirements of that provision. Id. at 72 n.30.
"'3 Id. at 68-78.
... Id. at 72.
"'I Id. at 70 (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 40,891 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 7111). Representative Hungate's remarks were made in explanation of the Conference
Committee's rejection of the Senate-proposed amendment to the Rules that would have al-
lowed for the admissibility of police reports upon a showing of the policeman's unavailability.
See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
li United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d at 71.
11 Id. at 72 (emphasis in original). The court also quoted extensively from the colloquy be-
tween Representatives Dennis and Holtzman regarding the latter's fear that police reports
might be admissible under one of the residual exceptions. Id. at 71-72. See supra notes 52-53
and accompanying text. The court acknowledged that Representative Dennis' response was ad-
dressed to the question of police reports, but the court found "no reason to doubt that, if
specifically asked, he would have answered that government-generated 'evaluative reports' were
similarly disqualified under any exception." United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d at 72.
18 The only textual qualification to admissibility of a business record is the general trustwor-
thiness proviso at the conclusion of rule 803(6). See supra note 62. The Oates court questioned
whether the chemist's reports at issue would have surmounted the trustworthiness hurdle even
if they had been eligible for admission under rule 803(6). United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d at 75.
On their face, they bore signs of irregularity. The chemist's worksheet contained a handwritten
notation indicating the chain of custody; a similar notation appeared on the official typewritten
report, but it was crossed out. Id. at 65. In addition, the copy of the official report given to
defense counsel prior to trial was unsigned, whereas the copy offered at trial contained the
chemist's signature. Id.
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not be interpreted literally; e19 rather, it should be interpreted so as to
effectuate the congressional intent underlying rule 803(8) to avoid all
possible conflicts between the hearsay exception for government
records and the defendant's confrontation rights. 20
Oates was undoubtedly correct in holding that reports specifically
excluded in criminal cases by rule 803(8) should also be excluded
under rule 803(6).121 Although it may be a general rule that hearsay
which does not satisfy one exception may be admitted pursuant to
another, 122 it would be logically inconsistent for Congress to have ex-
plicitly excluded particular types of records under rule 803(8)(B) and
(C) and yet to have sanctioned their entry as business records. To the
extent that Oates requires literal application of rule 803(B) and (C)
to all forensic laboratory reports, however, the decision divorces the
rule from its legislative history and conceptual underpinnings.
"' Id. at 75-77.
121 Id. at 78. The court reasoned that since Congress chose to exclude the admission of police
and evaluative reports because of their potential interference with an accused's right of con-
frontation, it follows that exclusionary treatment of such reports should apply with equal force
under "any of the other exceptions to the hearsay rule." Id. Since Congress intended rule
803(8)(B) and (C) to "serve as a filter to screen out evidence which might be suspect in the
event of a constitutional challenge on confrontation grounds," id. at 79, the court concluded
that it should do likewise and avoid deciding difficult constitutional questions by excluding
evidence which creates a tension with the right of confrontation. Id. at 79-80. Without specifi-
cally holding that the introduction of the chemist's reports violated Oates' right of confronta-
tion, id. at 80, the court nevertheless noted the existence of several problems in this regard. Id.
at 81-83. The court found that cross-examination might be necessary to determine the reliabil-
ity of such reports because it would provide an opportunity to probe the chemist's qualifica-
tions and experience, the general acceptance of the procedures and analyses which were used,
whether the tests were properly and accurately performed and whether the instruments were in
good working order. Id. at 81-82. Cross-examination would have been particularly important in
this case to resolve questions concerning the facial irregularities of the reports. Id. at 81; see
supra note 118. The court also observed that the reports were "crucial" to the government's
case. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d at 83. Assuming that the crucial nature of hearsay evi-
dence triggers a requirement that the witness either be produced or be shown to be unavailable,
id. at 82-83; see supra note 39, the government's showing of unavailability in this case was
weak. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d at 83. See supra note 110.
"' Several courts have indicated their agreement with this aspect of the Oates opinion. See,
e.g., United States v. Sims, 617 F.2d 1371, 1377 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Cain, 615 F.2d
380, 382 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hansen, 583 F.2d 325, 333 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 912 (1978). But see United States v. King, 613 F.2d 670, 672-73 (7th Cir. 1980) (Social
Security Administration forms held admissible against criminal defendant under rule 803(6)
when accompanied by the in-court testimony of their author); see infra notes 161-64 and ac-
companying text. In civil actions, there is greater disagreement whether rule 803(8) pre-empts
rule 803(6). Compare Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125,
1143 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1.980) (rule 803(8)(B) alone is applicable to business records prepared by
public officials) with Brown v. ASD Computing Center, 519 F. Supp. 1096, 1103 n.2 (S.D. Ohio
1981) (standards for admissibility under rule 803(6) may be utilized to admit government
agency records which do not fall within scope of rule 803(8)).
'1 United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d at 74.
Albany Law Review
The type of report covered by subdivision (B), for which Congress
determined there was an absolute need for cross-examination, was
that of the "policeman on the beat" concerning his contemporaneous
observations of a crime and the arrest of the accused. 123 Routine lab-
oratory analyses of the objective quality and characteristics of a sub-
stance or an object do not seem to fall within this category. Nor is
there any indication that Congress intended such reports to fall
within the exclusionary language of subdivision (C). As noted above,
Congress had little to say about the use in criminal cases of evalua-
tive reports under subdivision (C), apparently agreeing tacitly with
the Advisory Committee's statement that such reports would proba-
bly collide with the defendant's right of confrontation. 124 Evaluative
reports threaten confrontation rights when their reliability is inher-
ently doubtful either because of their subjective content and the ad-
versarial circumstances of their preparation or because of their au-
thors' reliance upon hearsay data obtained from persons under no
duty to provide accurate information.'25 A forensic technician's re-
port of his own routine laboratory test involving objective standards
and mechanical procedures, however, would seem to fall outside the
zone of presumptive unreliability. In any event, there is no indication
in the legislative history that Congress intended to circumscribe what
appears to have been the existing law that routine reports of objec-
tive scientific tests are admissible.1
26
Although the congressional intent underlying rule 803(8) may not
have been to render laboratory reports absolutely inadmissible, it
certainly does not follow that all such reports should be admissible.
Each report should be examined on a case-by-case basis to determine
whether its admission would contradict the teachings of the Palmer
doctrine or contravene the defendant's right of confrontation. Such
an approach may lack the simplicity of the all-inclusive Oates rule of
exclusion but, in appropriate cases, it would permit the fact-finder to
"1 See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
124 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
"25 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
"2' See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text. In criticizing the absolutist approach to
laboratory reports in Oates, the authors of one treatise have observed that "[no legislative
history indicates a Congressional intent to change in a revolutionary fashion the routine every-
day practice in both state and federal courts, particularly when no reason for such a change has
been shown." 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 4, 1 803(6)[07], at 803-177. The same
authors urge that regardless of whether the admissibility of government reports is tested under
rule 803(6) or rule 803(8), courts should be guided by Congress' intent to prevent "the dangers
of inaccurate observation and misrepresentation." Id. 803(8)[04], at 803-212. Accord S.
SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 93, at 612-13.
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consider reliable hearsay evidence and relieve the prosecution of the
burden of producing an unnecessary witness without unfairly depriv-
ing the defendant of the benefits of cross-examination.
In view of the ever-expanding forms of scientific evidence produced
in modern crime laboratories,12 it would be difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to suggest any rigid categories of permissible laboratory re-
ports.1 28 Since rule 803(8)(C) makes evaluative reports presumptively
inadmissible, it would be appropriate, initially, to cast upon the pros-
ecution the burden of satisfying the court that a particular report
qualified for admission.129 The prosecution should be required to
show that the report was made at or near the time of the test 30 and
that it was based on first-hand information provided by identifiable
government employees. 31 In addition, the government should show
that the laboratory technician who made the report possessed the
proper qualifications. 3 2 If the report bears facial signs of irregularity,
it should be excluded on this basis alone. " Beyond these particular-
ized foundation requirements, the court should evaluate the inherent
" See generally A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES (2d ed.
1978).
128 Some scientific evidence, of course, would not be admissible under any circumstances.
See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 598 F.2d 994, 995 (5th Cir. 1979) (results of polygraph exami-
nation inadmissible), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1128 (1981); United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541,
557 (6th Cir. 1977) (ion microprobic analysis of hair not a generally accepted comparison proce-
dure). A review of the current status of judicial standards for admitting scientific evidence is
set forth in Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A
Half-Century Later, 80 COLuM. L. REV. 1197, 1198-1245 (1980).
128 Such an approach would shift the burden that usually rests upon the opponent of evi-
dence under rule 803(8)(C) to show that the sources of information or other circumstances
indicate lack of trustworthiness. See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 93, at 579.
2 See supra note 86.
131 If the report is based upon the first-hand knowledge of the government employee or upon
data provided by his subordinates, the traditional presumption of reliability attending the work
of public officials will be met. See supra notes 4-5. A requirement that the officials be identified
will also ensure a means of verifying the qualifications of the officials, facilitate the defendant's
decision whether to subpoena the officials, see infra notes 152-53, and provide the defendant
with possible bases for impeachment of their credibility through such techniques as reputation
evidence, prior inconsistent statements, prior bad acts, or bias. See FED. R. EVID. 806 (credibil-
ity of hearsay declarant may be attacked as though he testified in person).
"I Cf. State v. Rhone, 555 S.W.2d 839, 841-42 (Mo. 1977) (evidence adduced at trial showed
that expert whose test results were introduced in a laboratory report was sufficiently qualified).
Part of the foundation for live testimony concerning the results of a scientific test is a showing
that the witness qualifies as an expert. See Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of
Scientific Evidence, 1970 ILL. L.F. 1, 20-21. The same rule should apply with equal force in the
case of an expert whose test results are conveyed through a written report.
122 Such facial irregularities in themselves would constitute "circumstances indicat[ing] lack
of trustworthiness." FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C). Exclusion of the laboratory report in Oates would
have been justifiable on this basis because of discrepancies which appeared in the documents
offered at trial. See supra note 118.
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reliability of the report. If it is a routine record of essentially
mechanical, objective laboratory operations, it should be admissible.
If, on the other hand, it contains a subjective interpretation of facts
or is accusatory in the sense that it consciously identifies the defen-
dant as a participant in criminal conduct, it should be excluded. 134
The pre-Federal Rules case of United States v. Beasley 3 5 illus-
trates how the objective-subjective criteria might be applied under
rule 803(8) in drawing the line between admissible and inadmissible
scientific analyses. Beasley held that the palm print taken from the
hold-up note used in an attempted robbery was admissible despite
the absence of testimony by the laboratory technician, because there
was nothing "accusatorial" in the mechanical test by which the print,
invisible to the naked eye, was "brought out."' 31 The fingerprinting
expert who matched the developed prints on the note with those of
the defendant, however, was "properly'. . . presented at trial and
cross-examined.' 3 7 A fingerprint analyst's opinion that palm prints
belong to a particular defendant is the type of report that should
continue to be excluded under rule 803(8). Such a conclusion is in-
herently accusatorial and is based on the personal judgment and in-
terpretation of the expert. 3 ' Since the expert would know the iden-
tity of the suspect, he would have both the motivation and the
opportunity to conform his opinion to the prosecution's theory. In
such case, the defendant should have an opportunity to challenge the
reliability of the expert's opinion by confronting him in court. The
same result should follow in regard to other forensic reports which
consist of highly subjective interpretations or tend to identify partic-
ular suspects as participants in a crime. ' e
,31 A somewhat similar approach is advocated in Imwinkelried, The Constitutionality of In-
troducing Evaluative Laboratory Reports Against Criminal Defendants, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 621,
636-49 (1979). Professor Imwinkelried argues that admission of laboratory reports violates con-
frontation rights when such reports are "highly evaluative." Id. at 643. His thesis that admis-
sion of evaluative reports is unconstitutional is based on findings of a nationwide survey that
crime laboratories have a less-than-perfect accuracy record in chemical analyses, thereby calling
into doubt their inherent reliability, id. at 636-37; that such evidence is usually crucial to the
prosecution's case, id. at 637-38; but see supra note 39; and that, in the absence of cross-exami-
nation, a lay jury will give improper weight to an evaluative opinion. Imwinkelried, supra, at
638-42. He concludes that laboratory reports should be presumptively admissible, but should be
excluded upon a showing by the defendant that "the report is so evaluative that it could be the
subject of varying expert opinion." Id. at 647.
438 F.2d 1279 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971).
" Id. at 1281.
137 Id.
13' But see Imwinkelried, supra note 134, at 641 (Beasley characterized as "strict" because
"there are fairly objective standards for fingerprint comparison").
"' Likely candidates for inclusion in this category are ballistics comparisons, see, e.g., Stew-
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By contrast, routine laboratory reports of simple mechanical opera-
tions in which subjective and adversarial components are minimal,
such as the chemical process by which fingerprint impressions are
made visible should continue to be admissible under rule 803(8)."40
Similarly, a routine report which merely identifies a substance or de-
scribes its objective characteristics, such as a report which states that
a specimen is cocaine,"" or. that a vaginal swab contains seminal
fluid,' 2 or that a blood sample contains .15% alcohol, 43 should qual-
art v. Cowan, 528 F.2d 79, 82-85 (6th Cir. 1976); psychiatric evaluations, see, e.g., Phillips v.
Neil, 452 F.2d 337, 347 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 884 (1972); voiceprint analyses,
see, e.g., Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 378, 391 A.2d 364, 366 (1978) (voiceprint technique is
dependent on the individual judgment of the examiner); and polygraph evidence, see, e.g., Im-
winkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence-A Primer on Evaluating the
Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 261, 282-83 (1981) (polygraphists' inter-
pretive standards are highly subjective). Forensic pathologists' opinions on causation of death
in autopsy reports have also been recognized as highly subjective. See generally Devlin, The
Autopsy in Criminal Cases, in SCIENTIFIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 1205-17 (E. Imwinkelried 2d
ed. 1981). Thus, several courts have admitted a medical examiner's objective findings of fact,
such as a description of a wound, but have excluded his opinions or conclusions as to causation.
See, e.g., State v. Reddick, 53 N.J. 66, 68, 248 A.2d 425, 426 (1968); People v. Nisonoff, 293
N.Y. 597, 600-04, 59 N.E.2d 420, 421-23 (1944); cf. Commonwealth v. McCloud, 457 Pa. 310,
315, 322 A.2d 653, 655-57 (1974) (autopsy report may not be used to prove cause of death). But
see Montgomery v. Fogg, 479 F. Supp. 363, 369-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (autopsy report that death
was caused by gunshot wounds of the head did not violate right of confrontation); Burleson v.
State, 585 S.W.2d 711, 712-13 (Tex. Crim. 1979) (autopsy report that death was caused by
multiple gunshot wounds of the chest admissible over confrontation challenge).
110 Records of maintenance tests on scientific equipment in crime laboratories, which may be
helpful in establishing that the results of experiments were accurate, should be admissible by
analogy to fingerprint processing. People v. Black, 84 Ill. App. 3d 1050, 1053, 406 N.E.2d 23, 25
(1980) (test decal on breathalyzer equipment). Such tests are not performed for any specific
prosecution but are part of the daily routine and upkeep of the laboratory. They are more akin
to the internal activities of the office, permissible under rule 803(8)(A), than to police reports or
investigatory factfindings.
4 See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 491 F.2d 517, 520-21 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 989 (1974); cf. United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 1123-24 (8th Cir.) (approving ad-
missibility of computer printouts of data collected by DEA laboratories throughout the country
revealing the number of instances in which specific adulterants were found in cocaine samples),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977). But see United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092,
1105 n.9 (5th Cir. 1981) (court expressed "serious reservations" on question whether laboratory
analysis identifying white substance as cocaine could be admissible over confrontation objec-
tions). Several state courts have upheld the admissibility of chemical analyses of suspected
drugs as either business or public records. See, e.g., State v. Cosgrove, 181 Conn. 562, 566-72,
436 A.2d 33, 36-44 (1980) (marijuana); In re Kevin G., 80 Misc. 2d 517, 521-24, 363 N.Y.S.2d
999, 1004-07 (Farn. Ct. 1975) (heroin). Contra Commonwealth v. McNaughton, 252 Pa. Super.
302, 309, 381 A.2d 929, 932 (1977) (hospital report; morphine); State v. Henderson, 554 S.W.2d
117, 122 (Tenn. 1977) (LSD).
4' See, e.g., Virgin Islands v. St. Ange, 458 F.2d 981 (3d Cir. 1972) (laboratory report finding
presence of semen in smear sample admissible as business record); Robertson v. Cox, 320 F.
Supp. 900 (W.D. Va. 1970) (report of chief medical examiner's office indicating presence of
seminal fluid in vaginal swabs did not violate right of confrontation because report did not
express an opinion but only a positive chemical finding); Clark v. Indiana, - Ind. - -, 436
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ify for admission under the rule if the tests upon which such a report
is based are ministerial in nature, requiring the analyst to do little
more than record the results of a mathematical computation or the
reading of a dial."' A showing that the test was performed as part of
the daily routine of a busy crime laboratory would answer a Palmer-
based argument that it was made with an eye toward prosecution. As
to repetitious tests performed on substances of unknown origins,
there would usually be insufficient motivation or opportunity for the
chemist to color the facts in such a way as to favor the prosecution's
case.145
A counterargument to the admission of even relatively objective
laboratory reports without testimony by the preparer is that cross-
examination could play a significant role in undermining the reliabil-
ity of the test results. As is the case generally with expert scientific
evidence, the adversary may have a great deal to gain by probing
such matters as the expert's qualifications and experience, the condi-
tions under which the test was made, and whether the instruments
used were in good working order." A partial answer to this argu-
ment, however, is that cross-examination would be of limited use in
shedding light on the performance of a routine test in a busy labora-
tory because of the unlikelihood that the analyst would have any in-
dependent recollection of the test.14 7 It was for this reason that Jus-
N.E.2d 779, 781-82 (1982) (report of state police technician on type of blood found on knife
held admissible); cf. United States v. McKinney, 631 F.2d 569, 571 (8th Cir. 1980) (improper
for FBI agent to testify about results of laboratory report which was not offered into evidence).
But see State v. Monroe, 345 So. 2d 1185, 1188-91 (La. 1977) (coroner's report showing pres-
ence of seminal fluid inadmissible unless author is unavailable).
"' See, e.g., Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476, 480-81 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 825
(1958); People v. Porter, 46 A.D.2d 307, 311-13, 362 N.Y.S.2d 249, 255-56 (1974) (blood test for
alcohol); State v. Kreck, 86 Wash. 2d 112, 119-21, 542 P.2d 782, 785-88 (1975) (blood test for
chloroform).
"' It is true, of course, that a subjective element can enter into even the reading of a dial.
See Lewis, The Element of Subjectivity in Interpreting Instrumental Test Results, in SCIEN-
TIPIC AND EXPERT EVIDENCE 409, 414 (E. Imwinkelried 2d ed. 1981) (expert pressed for time
may conclude: "That's close enough"). Subjectivity is a question of degree, and each type of
scientific test should be evaluated separately.
' If the chemist were inherently biased, it is more likely than not that he would always find
that a suspected substance was legally tainted. Such findings would undermine his credibility in
the long run since errors would be discovered sooner or later, thereby harming the govern-
ment's prosecutorial efforts. Thus, a chemist would arguably be motivated to make only ac-
curate findings. One court has characterized the work of crime laboratory chemists as a "check
on the prosecutorial effort" to assure the propriety of convictions and to avoid the prosecution's
expenditure of time on meritless cases if the substances examined are not contraband. State v.
Cosgrove, 181 Conn. 562, 577, 436 A.2d 33, 41 (1980).
"' See United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1977); supra note 120.
47 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. State v. Kreck, 86 Wash. 2d 112, 120, 542
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tice Harlan concluded in his concurring opinion in Dutton v. Evans148
that routine laboratory analyses would not violate a defendant's right
of confrontation.1 49 In addition, the analyst's qualifications will be
adequately established if the prosecution has laid a proper founda-
tion for admissibility of the report. Further, it is significant in evalu-
ating the fairness of introducing routine laboratory reports that the
defendant has the right, prior to trial, to review such reports'50 and
to inspect any documents or tangible objects "which are material to
[the] defense or are intended for use by the government as evidence
in chief at the trial, or were obtained from, or belong to, the defen-
dant."'151 Such discovery should facilitate the acquisition of evidence
by which to challenge the foundation for admissibility of the report
or to attack its merits if it is admitted. Finally, if the defendant be-
lieves that his case will benefit from the actual courtroom appearance
of the government analyst, he can subpoena the witness as his own'52
and seek to impeach his credibility on the stand. 53
P.2d 782, 787 (1975) (laboratory technician unlikely to recall test performed two years ago after
having conducted approximately one thousand tests in the meantime).
-48 400 U.S. 74, 93-100 (1970).
1'1 Justice Harlan cited Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
825 (1958), as an example of a case demonstrating why the confrontation clause should be
interpreted to permit hearsay exceptions which "eliminate the necessity for production of de-
clarants where production would be unduly inconvenient and of small utility to a defendant."
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. at 96. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
150 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(D) (defendant entitled to discovery and inspection of reports of
physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests or experiments). See, e.g., United States
v. Penix, 516 F. Supp. 248, 258 (W.D. Okla. 1981) (report of government's test on alleged
cocaine).
161 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(C). See, e.g., United States v. Acarino, 270 F. Supp. 526, 528
(E.D.N.Y. 1967) (defendant's expert permitted to test alleged heroin seized from defendant). A
growing body of authority holds that the prosecution is duty-bound to preserve discoverable
evidence for re-testing by the defendant. See United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 652 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641, 650, 527 P.2d 361, 367, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9, 15 (1974);
State v. Wright, 87 Wash. 2d 783, 789, 557 P.2d 1, 5 (1976). See generally Note, The Right to
Independent Testing: A New Hitch in the Preservation of Evidence Doctrine, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 1355 (1975). Such duty is particularly appropriate with respect to novel scientific evi-
dence. See Giannelli, supra note 128, at 1242-43.
"88 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17. The defendant's subpoena rights flow, in part, from the sixth amend-
ment's guarantee that he "have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI. See 8 R. CIPES, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE: RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
17.02 (2d ed. 1982). The defendant's sixth-amendment right to compulsory process is not a
cure for the prosecution's noncompliance with defendant's complementary sixth-amendment
right to confront the witnesses against him, but it helps preserve a balance of fairness in crimi-
nal trials when reliable hearsay evidence is admitted against the defendant. See generally Wes-
ten, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal
Cases, 91 HARV. L. REV. 567, 613-28 (1978).
158 FED. R. EVID. 607 (credibility of a witness may be attacked by party who called him). See
State v. Cosgrove, 181 Conn. 562, 579-80, 436 A.2d 33, 41-42 (1980) (defendant's rights of pre-
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In sum, the particular investigatory report, such as a government
laboratory analysis, should be admissible if it was made at or near
the time of the matter recorded, it is based on information from
identifiable government officials, its author is shown to be qualified in
his field, its contents describe primarily objective, routine matters
which are not directly accusatory of the defendant, and it is devoid of
facial irregularities.
C. The Effect of Live Testimony
Congress made it fairly clear that it intended government records
which are excluded under rule 803(8) to be inadmissible as evidence
in chief against criminal defendants under any exception to the hear-
say rule if the maker of the record does not testify at trial. 5 " Thus,
even if the author of a disqualified record is dead or actually unavail-
able for some other valid reason, the prosecution will not be able to
resort to the residual hearsay exception of rule 804(b)(5), which al-
lows for the admission of hearsay evidence not falling within a partic-
ular exception if the declarant is unavailable to testify and the state-
ment possesses sufficient "circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness.' ' 5 5 Resort to rule 804(b)(5) should be unavailing, in
any event, since the type of record properly excluded by 803(8) would
not satisfy rule 804(b)(5)'s requirement of trustworthiness. 56 An in-
trial discovery and subpoena power over chemist counterbalance the disadvantage of prosecu-
tor's failure to call the chemist). Accord State v. Spikes, 67 Ohio St. 2d 405, 413, 423 N.E.2d
1122, 1128 (1981), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 1131 (1982) (defendant could have subpoenaed
persons who prepared hospital records of victim).
"I" A Senate proposal to create a separate hearsay exception for police reports in cases in-
volving the unavailability of their authors was specifically rejected. See supra notes 50-53 and
accompanying text. Although the legislative history is less certain as to inadmissible investiga-
tory fact-findings, see supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text, the author's unavailability
should not make a difference. See infra note 156.
See supra note 52.
'" Cf. United States v. Love, 592 F.2d 1022, 1025-26 (8th Cir. 1979) (statement not falling
within exception for statement against penal interest also inadmissible under rule 804(b)(5)
because it was not sufficiently reliable); State v. Garvey, 283 N.W.2d 153, 156-57 (N.D. 1979)
(narcotics agent's memorandum written on bag containing alleged drugs inadmissible under
state adaptations of rules 803(6), 803(8), and 804(b)(5)). An analogous issue which has divided
the courts is whether the grand jury testimony of a witness who is unavailable for trial may be
admitted pursuant to rule 804(b)(5). Compare United States v. Gonzales, 559 F.2d 1271 (5th
Cir. 1977) (inadmissible because unreliable) with United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir.
1978) (admissible because testimony was corroborated). In dissenting from the Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari in United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 936 (1978), Justice Stewart expressed serious doubt that grand jury testimony was
reliable enough to satisfy the requirements of either rule 804(b)(5) or the sixth amendment. 439
U.S. at 936-40 (dissenting opinion).
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creased need for a report tainted by prosecutorial bias or highly sub-
jective content does nothing to enhance its reliability, and the re-
quirement of trustworthiness cannot constitutionally be set aside.157
Less certain is the extent to which a government report must be
excluded if the official who made the report testifies at trial. In
United States v. Sawyer,158 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
permitted introduction of the contents of an IRS officer's memoran-
dum of a phone conversation with the defendant under the exception
of rule 803(5) for recorded recollections'51 because the IRS officer
who testified at trial could not recall the particular conversation. 60
Under the business records exception, the same court, in United
States v. King,'6' upheld the admission of investigatory reports pre-
pared by agents of the Social Security Administration where the
agents testified at trial, apparently without any showing of their in-
ability to recall the transaction in issue.' In both cases the court
reasoned that Congress intended rule 803(8) to prevent the admission
of investigative reports as a "substitute" for live testimony, 163 and
that such intent would not be frustrated if the author of the report
,.. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. But see Imwinkelried, supra note 134, at
648 (recognizing possibility of admitting evaluative laboratory reports if analyst is "absolutely
unavailable and the scientific test could not be duplicated").
.. 607 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1980).
"I Federal Rule of Evidence 803(5) recognizes a hearsay exception for a memorandum or
record written or adopted by a witness at a time when the matter was fresh in his memory but
as to which he now has "insufficient recollection to enable him to testify fully and accurately."
FED. R. EviD. 803(5).
100 United States v. Sawyer, 607 F.2d at 1193. Accord United States v. Marshall, 532 F.2d
1279, 1285-86 (9th Cir. 1976) (in prosecution for possession of cocaine, chemist who had per-
formed analysis of drug had no recollection, at trial, of tests performed).
1 613 F.2d 670 (7th Cir. 1980).
... Id. at 673-74. United States v. Marshall, 683 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1982), similarly allowed
reports by an investigative agent of the Department of Agriculture to accompany the agent's
testimony in a prosecution for illegal redemption of food stamps. Id. at 1214-15. The alleged
misconduct occurred in 1981, and the reports, which consisted of interviews with the defendant
in 1976 and 1978, were offered on the issue of the defendant's prior knowledge that his conduct
was illegal. Id. See FED. R. EviD. 404(b). The court found no problem with the 1978 report and
described the 1976 report as "merely cumulative" of the agent's testimony. United States v.
Marshall, 683 F.2d at 1215. In a footnote, the court stated "the report might arguably have
been admissible under 803(8)." Id. at 1215 n.5. The dissent argued that the memoranda fell
within the exclusion of rule 803(8)(B) and would be admissible, if at all, only on redirect exami-
nation to rehabilitate an attack on the agent's memory. Id. at 1217-18 (dissenting opinion). See
infra note 177.
10' United States v. King, 613 F.2d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Sawyer, 607
F.2d 1190, 1193 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1980). On the floor of Congress,
criticism of the government-records hearsay exception centered upon the dangers of using po-
lice reports with "no other evidence being presented" or "in lieu of" the police officer's testi-
mony. 120 CONG. REc. 2388 (1974). See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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appeared at trial and his credibility could thereby be tested in the
presence of the factfinder."'
As suggested in Sawyer, if a law enforcement official is available to
testify at trial but cannot recall the details of a transaction which was
recorded by him when it was fresh in his memory, the proponent of
the evidence should be permitted to lay a foundation under rule
803(5) for reading the report into evidence as a past recollection re-
corded. 65 Such use of law enforcement records offers a reasonable
compromise between the prosecutorial need for evidence and the de-
fendant's interests in confronting government agents. The author's
presence will afford the defendant an opportunity to test the reliabil-
ity of the report and the credibility of its maker, thus answering most
confrontation challenges."" In addition, since the report itself cannot
"' United States v. King, 613 F.2d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Sawyer, 607
F.2d 1190, 1193 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1980).
"' See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text. The reliability of this hearsay exception
is said to lie in the requirements that the witness testify under oath, that the record was accu-
rate when made, and that the record was prepared closely in time to the event it records, when
memory was fresh. 3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 736. Because the relative contemporaneity of
the record may make it more reliable than subsequent oral testimony, a minority of courts have
held that admissibility does not depend upon any showing of an impaired memory. See, e.g.,
Jordan v. People, 151 Colo. 133, 376 P.2d 699 (1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 944 (1963); see 3 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 738. Rule 803(5) requires a showing of lapsed memory, however, in
order to discourage the use of self-serving statements prepared for purposes of litigation. FED.
R. EvID. 803(5) advisory committee note. This constraint is particularly appropriate in the case
of reports falling within the exclusionary scope of rule 803(8).
Rule 803(5) does not require a total lack of recollection, only that memory be "insufficient"
to enable full and accurate testimony. See supra note 159. Thus, if the witness' memory is only
partial, the rule may be invoked to admit portions of the record in order to fill in gaps in the
testimony. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 4, 803(5) [011, at 803-138. If showing
the report to the witness refreshes his recollection so as to enable him to testify fully from
present memory, the report should not qualify for admission under rule 803(5). C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 1, § 715.
I" United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 947 (1966),
described a confrontation-based objection to the use of past recollection recorded as "[sicraping
the bottom of the barrel." Id. at 770-71. Accord United States v. Marshall, 532 F.2d 1279, 1285
(9th Cir. 1976). In California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), a case involving the substantive use
of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness who became forgetful at trial, the Court held that
the confrontation clause is not violated if a declarant testifies as a witness and is "subject to
full and effective cross-examination." Id. at 158. In view of the longstanding acceptability of
past recollection recorded as a hearsay exception, see 3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 736, it
should be entitled, at minimum, to an inference of constitutionality. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56, 66 (1980); supra note 31 and accompanying text. Although the effectiveness of cross-
examination would be questionable if the witness lacked total recollection, this shortcoming
would probably not violate the confrontation clause. See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
188-89 (1970) (prosecutor's production of a witness satisfies confrontation clause regardless of
lapsed memory) (Harlan, J., concurring); United States v. Payne, 492 F.2d 449, 454 (4th Cir.
1974) (confrontation not violated where witness who claimed total lack of recollection of state-
ment was available for cross-examination on such matters as contemporaneous events and bias,
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be admitted as an exhibit by the proponent, the danger is removed
that the jury will give undue weight to the official document contain-
ing the witness' statement.' 71
The holding in King, which would appear to sanction the admissi-
bility of a law enforcement report whenever the author testifies in
person,168 is more questionable. If a report is excludable hearsay
under rule 803(8)(B) or (C), there is nothing in the author's appear-
ance that should transform the report into an admissible business re-
cord under rule 803(6)."' Although the discussions in Congress con-
cerning the exclusionary language of rule 803(8) focused only upon
disapproval of the introduction of police reports as the sole evidence
against the accused,1 70 there is no indication that Congress intended
to sanction the use of such reports as corroboration of live testimony.
If a government agent is able fully to recall and testify about an
event, 17  his written report thereof should be treated as a prior con-
sistent statement, 17 the admissibility of which should be denied dur-
ing direct examination because of its doubtful probative value and
unnecessarily cumulative effect.77 Further, in some circumstances
and jury had opportunity to observe demeanor), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 876 (1974); cf. Morgan,
supra note 2, at 719-20 (despite absence of full cross-examination, witness' presence will afford
sufficient basis for evaluation of his honesty and general capacities of perception, memory, and
narration).
'"7 Rule 803(5) provides: "If admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into evidence
but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party." A past recollec-
tion recorded becomes, in effect, the live testimony of the witness, a written version of which
will not be seen by the jury under normal circumstances. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
supra note 4, 803(5)[02], at 803-146.
'e See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
,60 See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
17 See supra notes 45 & 163 and accompanying text.
Perhaps King could be read as endorsing the view that lapsed memory should not be a
prerequisite for use of past recollection recorded. See 3 J. WIGmORE, supra note 2, § 387. This
view, however, was obviously rejected by the draftsmen of rule 803(5). See supra note 165.
A statement made out of court by a witness prior to trial and consistent with his trial
testimony has been treated by modern courts as hearsay. See Graham, Prior Consistent State-
ments: Rule 801(d)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Critique and Proposal, 30 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 575, 577-78, 581-82 (1979). Thus, prior consistent statements are generally denied
admissibility as affirmative evidence during a witness' direct testimony. See, e.g., United States
v. Weil, 561 F.2d 1109, 1111 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Leggett, 312 F.2d 566, 572
(4th Cir. 1962). Use of prior consistent statements has generally been permitted only when the
witness' trial testimony has been impeached in some manner. See infra note 177 and accompa-
nying text.
"I' The relevance of prior consistent statements on the issue of the witness' credibility is
slight because repetition of a possible falsehood does not increase its veracity. 4 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 2, § 1124. To the extent the prior consistency corroborates the witness' testimony,
such corroboration is merely cumulative and wasteful of the court's time because it does not
emanate from a truly independent source. Id.; Graham, supra note 172, at 578-81. See FED. R.
EVID. 403 (relevant evidence may be excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed
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admission of the report would constitute undue prejudice174 if the
format provided a summary of the prosecution's case in such a way
as to create in the minds of the jurors an aura of authoritativeness. 7 5
Rejection of the King approach, however, would not necessarily pre-
clude the admission of a law enforcement officer's report, under cau-
tionary instructions, for the purpose either of resolving some collat-
eral issue raised by the defendant 7 or of rebutting an attack on the
credibility of the officer's courtroom testimony. 77
Another issue related to the effect of live testimony on the admissi-
bility of a government record is whether an expert for the prosecu-
tion may properly testify at trial on the basis of data contained in
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consid-
erations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence").
'4 See FED. R. EvID. 403.
'7' See, e.g., United States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698, 700-01 (7th Cir. 1957) (admission of enve-
lopes on which undercover narcotics agents who testified at trial had noted the details of drug
purchases held reversible error because the jury was allowed to see documents which offered "a
neat condensation of the government's whole case against the defendant"); accord United
States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 235-36 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Brown, 451 F.2d 1231,
1234 (5th Cir. 1971).
176 See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 631 F.2d 908, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing rules 803(6)
and 803(8), court admitted DEA forms and envelopes in which an undercover agent who testi-
fied at trial had placed suspected narcotics because defendant put the government to the bur-
den of proving chain of custody); United States v. Parker, 491 F.2d 517, 522 & n.6a (8th Cir.
1973) (following narcotics agent's testimony, admission of lock-seal envelopes containing nota-
tions about drug purchase upheld because defendant attacked chain of custody), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 989 (1974).
177 Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) removes prior consistent statements from the defi-
nition of hearsay and permits their substantive use, i.e., their use for the truth of the matter
asserted, to rebut an express or implied charge of "recent fabrication or improper influence or
motive." It has been held that the making of the prior consistent statement must have pre-
ceded the time at which the motive to falsify arose. See, e.g., United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d
224, 232-34 (2d Cir. 1978) (error to admit IRS agent's record of a conversation with defendant
following an attack on the agent's prosecutorial bias because such bias would have been present
at the time he made the report, thus negating the relevance of the prior consistencies). But see
United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 284, 289 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978) (prior consistent statement can
be used to rebut charge of improper motive even though it was made after the alleged motive
arose).
Courts have divided over the issue whether a prior consistent statement may be used for the
non-hearsay purpose of rehabilitating the credibility of a witness whose testimony has been
impeached on grounds other than those specified in rule 801(d)(1)(B), such as by a showing of
inaccurate memory or prior inconsistencies. Compare United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224,
233-35 (2d Cir. 1978) (the standards for substantive admissibility under rule 801(d)(1)(B) are
the same as the standards for the more limited purpose of rehabilitation; general attack on
credibility does not suffice) with United States v. Coleman, 631 F.2d 908, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(imputation of inaccurate memory is sufficient to make prior consistent statements admissible)
(dictum) and United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 68-70 (2d Cir. 1979) (receipt of inconsistent
statements for impeachment should result in allowance of consistent ones for rehabilitation
without regard to whether "rigorous" standards of rule 801(d)(1)(B) have been met) (Friendly,
J., concurring), aff'd, 449 U.S. 424 (1981).
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government reports that are themselves inadmissible. Federal Rule of
Evidence 703 provides, without limitation to civil actions, that the
bases of opinion testimony by experts need not be admissible in evi-
dence "[i]f of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particu-
lar field in forming opinions.' 78 If an expert on the stand merely
relates the hearsay opinions of government agents, however, rule 703
could serve as a subterfuge for the presentation of "hearsay in dis-
guise.' ' 79 If the government officials are thereby insulated from cross-
examination, the defendant's confrontation rights will be seriously
jeopardized. 80
United States v. Lawson'8' typifies the approach courts have taken
in resolving this problem. Lawson, accused of extortion and assault,
pleaded insanity.12 Prior to trial he was examined for three months
at a federal medical center where a Dr. Robert B. Sheldon was chief
of psychiatry. 8 3 At the trial, Dr. Sheldon testified that in his opinion
Lawson was sane at the time he committed the alleged offenses. 8 4
Dr. Sheldon's personal observations of Lawson consisted of informal
conversations and participation at two staff interviews; he never in-
terviewed him privately.88 In forming his opinion, Dr. Sheldon also
relied upon several other sources, none of which were introduced into
evidence. These included reports received from two physicians at the
medical center who spent several hours in private with Lawson; re-
ports from staff members who observed Lawson; the results of tests
administered at the medical center; information from the Marine
Corps, of which Lawson had been a member; and reports from the
FBI agents who apprehended Lawson. 8 6 The district court admitted
Dr. Sheldon's opinion pursuant to rule 703, and the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed. 187
170 FED. R. EvID. 703. The rule marks a departure from common law practice, which permits
an expert to base his opinion only on first-hand knowledge or evidence which has been admit-
ted at trial. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 14, at 31, § 15, at 34. The theory of rule 703 is
that the expert, because of his professional qualifications, should be able to judge for himself
the reliability of the data upon which he bases his opinion. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 15,
at 35-36.
179 See United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir. 1971) (en banc) (expert
whose testimony was in issue was not a mere "summary witness" who did no more than sum-
marize the contents of hearsay sources), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 954 (1972).
160 See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 4, V 703[04], at 703-24.
.81 653 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1150 (1982).





181 Id. at 300-01.
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The court held that an expert's testimony based solely on hearsay
reports would violate a defendant's right of confrontation.18 Such
right was not violated in this case, however, because "Dr. Sheldon
had had at least some contact with Lawson himself."'' 9 Furthermore,
effective cross-examination of Dr. Sheldon was assured because the
defendant was given access in advance of trial to the hearsay infor-
mation that Dr. Sheldon relied upon.1 90 Like the court in Lawson,
other courts upholding testimony by prosecution experts based on
hearsay reports from government agents have done so only when the
expert formed an independent opinion and relied only partially on
inadmissible data.'
Such an approach is acceptable provided the trial court carefully
scrutinizes the expert's opinion to be certain that it consists of an
independent appraisal of the facts and that it is based, at least par-
tially, on either first-hand knowledge or other admissible evidence. 92
I Id. at 302.
ISO Id. at 303 (emphasis in original).
IO0 Id. at 302-03.
"' See, e.g., United States v. Arias, 678 F.2d 1202, 1206 (4th Cir.) (expert's opinion that
drugs were imported from Colombia was based on his own comparison with sample whose Co-
lombian origins were based on government agent's report), cert. denied sub nom. Faircloth v.
United States, 103 S. Ct. 218 (1982); United States v. Genser 582 F.2d 292, 298-99 (3d Cir.
1978) (expert's opinion that certain funds constituted unreported income was apparently based
on personal review of books and records, and on audit conducted by government agents), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 928 (1979); United States v. Morrison, 531 F.2d 1089, 1094 (1st Cir.) (in gam-
bling prosecution, expert's opinion regarding daily totals of wagers made in defendant's opera-
tion was based on review of analysis conducted in FBI laboratory, sample-checking of computa-
tions therein, and independent verification of number of persons involved), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 837 (1976); United States v. Golden, 532 F.2d 1244, 1247-48 (9th Cir.) (FBI agent's opinion
of value of seized heroin was based on personal prior purchases and reports from other agents
familiar with the market), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 842 (1976).
92 A case demonstrating the degree to which courts may differ in drawing conclusions from
such scrutiny is State v. Reardon, 172 Conn. 593, 376 A.2d 65 (1977), a narcotics prosecution in
which the supervisor of a laboratory rendered an opinion at trial that the substance seized from
the defendant was marijuana. Id. at 594, 376 A.2d at 66. He had not personally performed the
tests on the substance in question, but he testified that he had delivered the substance to a
chemist under his supervision at a desk twelve feet from his own and directed that the tests be
performed; that he observed the chemist as she performed the tests, though he did not see each
detail; that he personally observed the results of a chemical test and a thin-layer chromatogra-
phy test (the latter being sufficient alone to establish the presence of marijuana); and that he
did not see the results of a microscopic examination. Id. at 595-97, 376 A.2d at 66-67. The
court, properly it seems, held that the supervisor's opinion was admissible because it was based
in part on his personal observations and review of the results of routine tests and reports made
under his supervision and upon which he could reasonably rely. Id. at 597-98, 376 A.2d at 67.
A federal district court, however, granted a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the
defendant's right of confrontation had been denied. Reardon v. Manson, 491 F. Supp. 982, 985-
89 (D. Conn. 1980), remanded, 644 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981). The federal court characterized the
supervisor's testimony as a mere repetition of information provided by the chemist. Id. at 985.
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If the only bases for the expert's opinion are statements or opinions
in government reports which have not satisfied the reliability thresh-
old for admissibility in their own right, the prosecution will be
achieving indirectly what it cannot do directly, thus depriving the de-
fendant of an opportunity to confront the witnesses against him. As-
suming the expert who relies partially on hearsay in government
records is permitted to render an opinion, the court should also en-
sure that the defendant has been given adequate opportunity to ex-
amine the data in advance in order to facilitate cross-examination
and allow the defendant to prepare an attack on the weight of the
expert's opinion. 9 ' Finally, careful jury instructions should be given,
cautioning against acceptance of the hearsay data for its truth."4
III. CONCLUSION
As a matter of effective trial advocacy, prosecutors in most cases
would probably prefer to present the live testimony of a government
officer over the dry, printed word of his official report. Particularly in
a case involving scientific evidence, presentation through an expert
witness with impressive credentials would likely have a more persua-
sive impact on the jury. Obviously, the appearance of live witnesses
would minimize the risk of committing reversible error on hearsay or
constitutional grounds. Nevertheless, if government employees are
unavailable for trial or their appearance would be inconvenient, inef-
ficient, or unnecessary from the prosecutor's perspective, their duly-
prepared reports should be admissible if they meet a satisfactory
threshold of reliability.
As to the microscopic test, he had no personal knowledge, and as to the results of the other
tests, he had no independent knowledge that the results thereof pertained to the substance that
he had delivered for examination or that the tests had been properly performed. Id. The court
drew extensively upon the standards for testing confrontation rights articulated in United
States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 80-83 (2d Cir. 1977). See supra note 120. The district court deci-
sion was remanded for reconsideration by the court of appeals because the district court judge
had found facts substantially different from those found by the state court, without setting
forth any reason as to why the state court's presumptively correct findings were erroneous.
Reardon v. Manson, 644 F.2d 122, 127-130 (2d Cir. 1981). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976).
" See United States v. Lawson, 653 F.2d 299, 302-03 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1150 (1982). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 705, the judge may require advance disclos-
ure of the facts or data upon which an expert renders an opinon. The defendant may also seek
discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BER-
GER, supra note 4, 703[41, at 703-26 (problems relating to government's intent to use expert
testimony based on hearsay and defendant's review of the data should be solved at a pretrial
conference).
1'4 See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 4, 703[41, at 703-27 to -28.
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Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8), in its present form, adds a degree
of certainty in measuring the threshold of reliability by excluding
from use against criminal defendants matters observed by law en-
forcement personnel and findings of fact based on government inves-
tigations. The rule manifests the drafters' conclusion that such
records are frequently unreliable because of their subjective, evalua-
tive nature and their inherent potential for prosecutorial bias. Re-
ceiving into evidence reports actually possessing such qualities would
undermine the goal of enhanced accuracy in fact-finding that society
has demanded in criminal cases and would violate the defendant's
right of confrontation.
Literal application of rule 803(8)'s exclusionary language, however,
would often impose upon the prosecution the burden of producing
available public officials whose appearance at trial would add little or
nothing to the existing reliability of their written reports. Therefore,
a number of appellate courts, acting in accordance with the underly-
ing purposes of the rule's exclusions, have properly eschewed a literal
reading in favor of an individualized evaluation of the content and
purpose of the report in question, the circumstances under which it
was prepared, and the manner and mode by which it was offered at
trial. These courts have recognized that records prepared by govern-
ment officials in routine, nonadversarial circumstances and describing
matters that are essentially objective in nature may be sufficiently
reliable to overcome generalized objections based on the motivational
bias and subjectivity of their authors. Such reasoning is persuasive
and should continue to be followed both by federal courts and state
courts applying adaptations of rule 803(8).
In order to clarify the type of public records that may properly be
used in criminal trials, however, it would be helpful if rule 803(8)
were amended to read as follows:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness:
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements or data
compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth
(A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pur-
suant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to
report, or (C) factual findings resulting from an investigation made
pursuant to authority granted by law, unless as to any of the foregoing
the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness. Records and reports encompassed by subdivisions (B)
and (C) may not be offered against the accused in a criminal case,
however, except upon a showing by the government that the record or
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report (1) was made at or near the time of occurrence of the recorded
matter by, or from information transmitted by, a qualified person
with knowledge, (2) consists of essentially objective and nonac-
cusatory matters, (3) was prepared under nonadversarial circum-
stances and (4) is otherwise circumstantially trustworthy.
In accordance with the views advocated in this Article, the proposed
language would treat reports of all government agents' observations
and investigatory fact-findings as presumptively inadmissible in
criminal cases. In addition it would shift to the prosecution the bur-
den of establishing that a record is sufficiently reliable because of its
relative contemporaneity to the events in question, its identifiable
sources of information, its objective and nonaccusatory content, the
nonadversarial circumstances of its preparation, and the absence of
other untrustworthy circumstances.' A public record failing to sat-
isfy the foregoing standards would be inadmissible as evidence in
chief to prove an essential element of a crime in all cases in which the
author does not testify at trial. Courts should retain sufficient flex-
ibility, however, to allow the use of an otherwise disqualified record
in conjunction with live testimony if the factfinder is afforded an ad-
equate opportunity to weigh the reliability of the evidence. For ex-
ample, a government agent's investigatory report might properly be
used as a past recollection recorded, as a prior consistent statement,
or as a partial basis for expert testimony, assuming the requirements
of the pertinent rules are met and the evidence is accompanied by
the court's cautionary instructions. In all cases, courts should exercise
their discretion to prohibit a use of public records that would mislead
or confuse, cause unfair prejudice, or result in unnecessary accumula-
tion of evidence.
This Article has sought to show that the exclusion of reports of law
enforcement officers and investigatory factfindings from the public
records hearsay exception in criminal cases, although based on a jus-
tifiable concern for the accused's right of confrontation, should not
' The revised version of rule 803(8) would eliminate the categorical exclusion of reports by
"police officers and other law enforcement personnel," thereby focusing attention on the cir-
cumstantial reliability of the individual report. See supra note 71. The fact that the report was
written by a law enforcement officer would be an important factor for the court to consider, but
would not be determinative of admissibility. The revision would also make clear that the con-
cluding trustworthiness proviso applies to all categories of reports under rule 803(8). See supra
note 93. The requirement of identification of the source of information contained in the report
would change the result of cases such as United States v. Hudson, 479 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1972),
see supra note 71, holding that anonymous entries in government files are sufficient to satisfy
the public records exception. See United States v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1046, 1048-49 (9th Cir.
1973) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting), vacated, 415 U.S. 971 (1974).
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be absolute. In the final analysis, courts should seek to ensure that
criminal trials are decided on the basis of reliable evidence, not by
mechanical application of statutory language.
